[PATCH 4.14 32/95] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC

[PATCH 4.14 32/95] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 0a0b152083cfc44ec1bb599b57b7aab41327f998 upstream.

I got a bug report that the following code (roughly) was
causing a SIGSEGV:

	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_EXEC);
	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ);
	*ptr = 100;

The problem is hit when the mprotect(PROT_EXEC)
is implicitly assigned a protection key to the VMA, and made
that key ACCESS_DENY|WRITE_DENY.  The PROT_NONE mprotect()
failed to remove the protection key, and the PROT_NONE->
PROT_READ left the PTE usable, but the pkey still in place
and left the memory inaccessible.

To fix this, we ensure that we always "override" the pkee
at mprotect() if the VMA does not have execute-only
permissions, but the VMA has the execute-only pkey.

We had a check for PROT_READ/WRITE, but it did not work
for PROT_NONE.  This entirely removes the PROT_* checks,
which ensures that PROT_NONE now works.

Reported-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 62b5f7d013f ("mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171351.084C5A71@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h |   12 +++++++++++-
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c          |   21 +++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 #define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 
+#define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY	0
+
 #define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1)
 
 extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
@@ -15,7 +17,7 @@ extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm
 static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
-		return 0;
+		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
 
 	return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
 }
@@ -56,6 +58,14 @@ bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_stru
 		return false;
 	if (pkey >= arch_max_pkey())
 		return false;
+	/*
+	 * The exec-only pkey is set in the allocation map, but
+	 * is not available to any of the user interfaces like
+	 * mprotect_pkey().
+	 */
+	if (pkey == mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
+		return false;
+
 	return mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & (1U << pkey);
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -94,26 +94,27 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct
 	 */
 	if (pkey != -1)
 		return pkey;
-	/*
-	 * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
-	 * which is now being given permissions that are not
-	 * execute-only.  Move it back to the default pkey.
-	 */
-	if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
-	    (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
-		return 0;
-	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The mapping is execute-only.  Go try to get the
 	 * execute-only protection key.  If we fail to do that,
 	 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
-	 * support.
+	 * support in this mm.
 	 */
 	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
 		pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
 		if (pkey > 0)
 			return pkey;
+	} else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) {
+		/*
+		 * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping
+		 * is using the exec-only pkey.  This mapping was
+		 * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be.  Move back to
+		 * the default pkey.
+		 */
+		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
 	}
+
 	/*
 	 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
 	 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we

[PATCH 4.14 33/95] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 2fa9d1cfaf0e02f8abef0757002bff12dfcfa4e6 upstream.

mm_pkey_is_allocated() treats pkey 0 as unallocated.  That is
inconsistent with the manpages, and also inconsistent with
mm->context.pkey_allocation_map.  Stop special casing it and only
disallow values that are actually bad (< 0).

The end-user visible effect of this is that you can now use
mprotect_pkey() to set pkey=0.

This is a bit nicer than what Ram proposed[1] because it is simpler
and removes special-casing for pkey 0.  On the other hand, it does
allow applications to pkey_free() pkey-0, but that's just a silly
thing to do, so we are not going to protect against it.

The scenario that could happen is similar to what happens if you free
any other pkey that is in use: it might get reallocated later and used
to protect some other data.  The most likely scenario is that pkey-0
comes back from pkey_alloc(), an access-disable or write-disable bit
is set in PKRU for it, and the next stack access will SIGSEGV.  It's
not horribly different from if you mprotect()'d your stack or heap to
be unreadable or unwritable, which is generally very foolish, but also
not explicitly prevented by the kernel.

1. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1522112702-27853-1-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>p
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 58ab9a088dda ("x86/pkeys: Check against max pkey to avoid overflows")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171358.47FD785E@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |    2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h       |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struc
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
-		/* pkey 0 is the default and always allocated */
+		/* pkey 0 is the default and allocated implicitly */
 		mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = 0x1;
 		/* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_stru
 {
 	/*
 	 * "Allocated" pkeys are those that have been returned
-	 * from pkey_alloc().  pkey 0 is special, and never
-	 * returned from pkey_alloc().
+	 * from pkey_alloc() or pkey 0 which is allocated
+	 * implicitly when the mm is created.
 	 */
-	if (pkey <= 0)
+	if (pkey < 0)
 		return false;
 	if (pkey >= arch_max_pkey())
 		return false;

[PATCH 4.14 36/95] x86/mm: Drop TS_COMPAT on 64-bit exec() syscall

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>

commit acf46020012ccbca1172e9c7aeab399c950d9212 upstream.

The x86 mmap() code selects the mmap base for an allocation depending on
the bitness of the syscall. For 64bit sycalls it select mm->mmap_base and
for 32bit mm->mmap_compat_base.

exec() calls mmap() which in turn uses in_compat_syscall() to check whether
the mapping is for a 32bit or a 64bit task. The decision is made on the
following criteria:

  ia32    child->thread.status & TS_COMPAT
   x32    child->pt_regs.orig_ax & __X32_SYSCALL_BIT
  ia64    !ia32 && !x32

__set_personality_x32() was dropping TS_COMPAT flag, but
set_personality_64bit() has kept compat syscall flag making
in_compat_syscall() return true during the first exec() syscall.

Which in result has user-visible effects, mentioned by Alexey:
1) It breaks ASAN
$ gcc -fsanitize=address wrap.c -o wrap-asan
$ ./wrap32 ./wrap-asan true
==1217==Shadow memory range interleaves with an existing memory mapping. ASan cannot proceed correctly. ABORTING.
==1217==ASan shadow was supposed to be located in the [0x00007fff7000-0x10007fff7fff] range.
==1217==Process memory map follows:
        0x000000400000-0x000000401000   /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
        0x000000600000-0x000000601000   /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
        0x000000601000-0x000000602000   /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
        0x0000f7dbd000-0x0000f7de2000   /lib64/ld-2.27.so
        0x0000f7fe2000-0x0000f7fe3000   /lib64/ld-2.27.so
        0x0000f7fe3000-0x0000f7fe4000   /lib64/ld-2.27.so
        0x0000f7fe4000-0x0000f7fe5000
        0x7fed9abff000-0x7fed9af54000
        0x7fed9af54000-0x7fed9af6b000   /lib64/libgcc_s.so.1
[snip]

2) It doesn't seem to be great for security if an attacker always knows
that ld.so is going to be mapped into the first 4GB in this case
(the same thing happens for PIEs as well).

The testcase:
$ cat wrap.c

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  execvp(argv[1], &argv[1]);
  return 127;
}

$ gcc wrap.c -o wrap
$ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 ./wrap ./wrap true |& grep AT_BASE
AT_BASE:         0x7f63b8309000
AT_BASE:         0x7faec143c000
AT_BASE:         0x7fbdb25fa000

$ gcc -m32 wrap.c -o wrap32
$ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 ./wrap32 ./wrap true |& grep AT_BASE
AT_BASE:         0xf7eff000
AT_BASE:         0xf7cee000
AT_BASE:         0x7f8b9774e000

Fixes: 1b028f784e8c ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()")
Fixes: ada26481dfe6 ("x86/mm: Make in_compat_syscall() work during exec")
Reported-by: Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>
Bisected-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
Investigated-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180517233510.24996-1-dima@arista.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ void set_personality_64bit(void)
 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32);
 	/* Pretend that this comes from a 64bit execve */
 	task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_execve;
+	current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT;
 
 	/* Ensure the corresponding mm is not marked. */
 	if (current->mm)