From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC, PATCH 15/22] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 19:26:03 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180305162610.37510-16-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180305162610.37510-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
mktme_nr_keyids holds number of KeyIDs available for MKTME, excluding
KeyID zero which used by TME. MKTME KeyIDs start from 1.
mktme_keyid_shift holds shift of KeyID within physical address.
mktme_keyid_mask holds mask to extract KeyID from physical address.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 13 +++++++++----
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mktme.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..df31876ec48c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mktme.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_MKTME_H
+#define _ASM_X86_MKTME_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
+extern phys_addr_t mktme_keyid_mask;
+extern int mktme_nr_keyids;
+extern int mktme_keyid_shift;
+#else
+#define mktme_keyid_mask ((phys_addr_t)0)
+#define mktme_nr_keyids 0
+#define mktme_keyid_shift 0
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 35436bbadd0b..77b5dc937ac6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -589,11 +589,13 @@ static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* and number of bits claimed for KeyID is 6, bits 51:46 of
* physical address is unusable.
*/
- phys_addr_t keyid_mask;
+ mktme_keyid_mask = 1ULL << c->x86_phys_bits;
+ mktme_keyid_mask -= 1ULL << (c->x86_phys_bits - keyid_bits);
+ physical_mask &= ~mktme_keyid_mask;
- keyid_mask = 1ULL << c->x86_phys_bits;
- keyid_mask -= 1ULL << (c->x86_phys_bits - keyid_bits);
- physical_mask &= ~keyid_mask;
+
+ mktme_nr_keyids = nr_keyids;
+ mktme_keyid_shift = c->x86_phys_bits - keyid_bits;
} else {
/*
* Reset __PHYSICAL_MASK.
@@ -601,6 +603,9 @@ static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* between CPUs.
*/
physical_mask = (1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1;
+ mktme_keyid_mask = 0;
+ mktme_keyid_shift = 0;
+ mktme_nr_keyids = 0;
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 4b101dd6e52f..4ebee899c363 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -53,3 +53,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME) += mktme.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..467f1b26c737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mktme.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#include <asm/mktme.h>
+
+phys_addr_t mktme_keyid_mask;
+int mktme_nr_keyids;
+int mktme_keyid_shift;
--
2.16.1
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-05 16:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-05 16:25 [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 01/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel Total Memory Encryption cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 02/22] x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 03/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel PCONFIG cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 04/22] x86/pconfig: Detect PCONFIG targets Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 05/22] x86/pconfig: Provide defines and helper to run MKTME_KEY_PROG leaf Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 06/22] x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 07/22] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 15:55 ` Punit Agrawal
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 08/22] mm: Introduce __GFP_ENCRYPT Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 16:02 ` Punit Agrawal
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 09/22] mm, rmap: Add arch-specific field into anon_vma Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 10/22] mm/shmem: Zero out unused vma fields in shmem_pseudo_vma_init() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 11/22] mm: Use __GFP_ENCRYPT for pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 12/22] mm: Do no merge vma with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 13/22] mm, rmap: Free encrypted pages once mapcount drops to zero Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:12 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 14:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 15:00 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 14/22] mm, khugepaged: Do not collapse pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 16/22] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:30 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 17/22] x86/mm: Implement vma_is_encrypted() and vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 18/22] x86/mm: Handle allocation of encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:03 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:36 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 19/22] x86/mm: Implement free_encrypt_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:00 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:38 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 13:52 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:09 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-20 12:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-27 14:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 20/22] x86/mm: Implement anon_vma_encrypted() and anon_vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 21/22] x86/mm: Introduce page_keyid() and page_encrypted() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 17:08 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 8:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 14:56 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 15:04 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 22/22] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 18:30 ` [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Christoph Hellwig
2018-03-05 19:05 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-06 8:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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