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From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
To: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	syzbot
	<bot+719398b443fd30155f92f2a888e749026c62b427@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
	David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>,
	keun-o.park@darkmatter.ae, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Subject: Re: BUG: bad usercopy in memdup_user
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 07:33:57 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171219203357.GT19604@eros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171219132246.GD13680@bombadil.infradead.org>

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 05:22:46AM -0800, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 07:37:46PM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 09:12:58AM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> > > On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 1:57 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 6:22 AM, Tetsuo Handa
> > > >> This BUG is reporting
> > > >>
> > > >> [   26.089789] usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to 0000000022a5b430 (kmalloc-1024) (1024 bytes)
> > > >>
> > > >> line. But isn't 0000000022a5b430 strange for kmalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL)ed kernel address?
> > > >
> > > > The address is hashed (see the %p threads for 4.15).
> > > 
> > > 
> > > +Tobin, is there a way to disable hashing entirely? The only
> > > designation of syzbot is providing crash reports to kernel developers
> > > with as much info as possible. It's fine for it to leak whatever.
> > 
> > We have new specifier %px to print addresses in hex if leaking info is
> > not a worry.
> 
> Could we have a way to know that the printed address is hashed and not just
> a pointer getting completely scrogged?  Perhaps prefix it with ... a hash!
> So this line would look like:
> 
> [   26.089789] usercopy: kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to #0000000022a5b430 (kmalloc-1024) (1024 bytes)

This poses the risk of breaking userland tools that parse the
address. The zeroing of the first 32 bits was a design compromise to
keep the address format while making _kind of_ explicit that some funny
business was going on.

> Or does that miss the point of hashing the address, so the attacker
> thinks its a real address?

No subterfuge intended.

Bonus points Wily, I had to go to 'The New Hackers Dictionary' to look
up 'scrogged' :)

thanks,
Tobin.

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-12-19 20:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-18 13:40 syzbot
2017-12-18 14:22 ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-12-19  0:57   ` Kees Cook
2017-12-19  8:12     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2017-12-19  8:37       ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-12-19  8:41         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2017-12-19  9:04           ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-12-19  9:07             ` Dmitry Vyukov
2017-12-19 13:22         ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-19 13:41           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2017-12-19 14:08             ` Tetsuo Handa
2017-12-19 14:12               ` Dmitry Vyukov
2017-12-19 20:45                 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-12-19 20:33           ` Tobin C. Harding [this message]
2017-12-19 21:36           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-19 21:48             ` Al Viro
2017-12-19 22:09               ` Randy Dunlap
2017-12-19 23:24               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-20  3:50               ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-20  4:05                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-20  4:36                   ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-20  9:44               ` David Laight
2017-12-31  8:11                 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2017-12-19 21:54             ` Kees Cook
2017-12-19 22:16             ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-12-19 22:24             ` Laura Abbott

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