From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
keescook@google.com, hughd@google.com,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>,
aliguori@amazon.com, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted()
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2017 15:37:30 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171214143730.s6w7sd6c7b5t6fqp@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171214124117.wfzcjdczyta2sery@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 01:41:17PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 12:27:27PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > The gup_*_range() functions which implement __get_user_pages_fast() do
> > a p*_access_permitted() test to see if the memory is at all accessible
> > (tests both _PAGE_USER|_PAGE_RW as well as architectural things like
> > pkeys).
> >
> > But the follow_*() functions which implement __get_user_pages() do not
> > have this test. Recently, commit:
> >
> > 5c9d2d5c269c ("mm: replace pte_write with pte_access_permitted in fault + gup paths")
> >
> > added it to a few specific write paths, but it failed to consistently
> > apply it (I've not audited anything outside of gup).
> >
> > Revert the change from that patch and insert the tests in the right
> > locations such that they cover all READ / WRITE accesses for all
> > pte/pmd/pud levels.
> >
> > In particular I care about the _PAGE_USER test, we should not ever,
> > allow access to pages not marked with it, but it also makes the pkey
> > accesses more consistent.
>
> This should probably go on top. These are now all superfluous and
> slightly wrong.
I also cannot explain dax_mapping_entry_mkclean(), why would we not make
clean those pages that are not pkey writable (but clearly are writable
and dirty)? That doesn't make any sense at all.
Kirill did point out that my patch(es) break FOLL_DUMP in that it would
now exclude pkey protected pages from core-dumps.
My counter argument is that it will now properly exclude !_PAGE_USER
pages.
If we change p??_access_permitted() to pass the full follow flags
instead of just the write part we could fix that.
I'm also looking at pte_access_permitted() in handle_pte_fault(); that
looks very dodgy to me. How does that not result in endlessly CoW'ing
the same page over and over when we have a PKEY disallowing write access
on that page?
Bah... /me grumpy
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-14 14:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-14 11:27 [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] mm/gup: Fixup p*_access_permitted() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 14:37 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2017-12-14 20:44 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-14 20:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 5:04 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-15 6:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15 7:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-16 0:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16 0:29 ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16 1:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16 1:25 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16 2:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16 2:48 ` Al Viro
2017-12-16 2:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16 3:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-16 3:21 ` Dave Hansen
2017-12-16 1:29 ` Dan Williams
2017-12-16 0:31 ` Al Viro
2017-12-16 1:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-15 8:00 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 10:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 11:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-15 16:38 ` Dan Williams
2017-12-18 11:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-18 18:42 ` Dan Williams
2017-12-15 14:04 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] mm: Exempt special mappings from mlock(), mprotect() and madvise() Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-02 16:44 ` Dmitry Safonov
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] arch: Allow arch_dup_mmap() to fail Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] x86/ldt: Rework locking Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] x86/ldt: Prevent ldt inheritance on exec Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] x86/ldt: Do not install LDT for kernel threads Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 19:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] mm/softdirty: Move VM_SOFTDIRTY into high bits Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] mm/x86: Allow special mappings with user access cleared Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] mm: Provide vm_special_mapping::close Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] selftest/x86: Implement additional LDT selftests Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Prepare for access bit forced Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 19:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 21:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 21:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 22:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 22:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 22:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 22:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] mm: Make populate_vma_page_range() available Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] x86/mm: Force LDT desc accessed bit Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] x86/ldt: Reshuffle code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 16:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] x86/ldt: Prepare for VMA mapping Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] x86/ldt: Add VMA management code Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 11:27 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] x86/ldt: Make it read only VMA mapped Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 12:03 ` [PATCH v2 00/17] x86/ldt: Use a VMA based read only mapping Thomas Gleixner
2017-12-14 12:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-14 16:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-14 17:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
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