From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
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"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
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"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 07:56:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170711055659.GA4554@nazgul.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMzpN2hqYMVwhDRTGEhcUxqN2+6ToMmy6NBUutYJgPoOJEH4uQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 01:07:46AM -0400, Brian Gerst wrote:
> > If I make the scattered feature support conditional on CONFIG_X86_64
> > (based on comment below) then cpu_has() will always be false unless
> > CONFIG_X86_64 is enabled. So this won't need to be wrapped by the
> > #ifdef.
>
> If you change it to use cpu_feature_enabled(), gcc will see that it is
> disabled and eliminate the dead code at compile time.
Just do this:
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
} else {
u64 msr;
/* Check if SME is enabled */
rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
}
}
so that it is explicit that we disable it on 32-bit and we can save us
the ifdeffery elsewhere.
Thanks.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-11 5:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-07 13:38 [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 9:24 ` [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Ingo Molnar
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
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