From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 11:24:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170708092426.prf7xmmnv6xvdqx4@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170707133804.29711.1616.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
* Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
> This patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
> feature.
I'm wondering, what's the typical performance hit to DRAM access latency when SME
is enabled?
On that same note, if the performance hit is noticeable I'd expect SME to not be
enabled in native kernels typically - but still it looks like a useful hardware
feature. Since it's controlled at the page table level, have you considered
allowing SME-activated vmas via mmap(), even on kernels that are otherwise not
using encrypted DRAM?
One would think that putting encryption keys into such encrypted RAM regions would
generally improve robustness against various physical space attacks that want to
extract keys but don't have full control of the CPU.
Thanks,
Ingo
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-08 9:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-07 13:38 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 9:24 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2017-07-10 18:04 ` [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
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