From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
linus.walleij@linaro.org, gary.hook@amd.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
piotr.luc@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com,
ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, dyoung@redhat.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
arnd@arndb.de, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, luto@kernel.org,
devel@linuxdriverproject.org, bhelgaas@google.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, tj@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 20:29:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170309192919.lt3gfqeuhlsoylu7@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846770159.2349.16863375000963463500.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
On Thu, Mar 02, 2017 at 10:15:01AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Modify the SVM cpuid update function to indicate if Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization (SEV) is active in the guest by setting the SEV KVM CPU
> features bit. SEV is active if Secure Memory Encryption is enabled in
> the host and the SEV_ENABLE bit of the VMCB is set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 1639de8..e0c40a8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> entry->edx = 0;
> break;
> case 0x80000000:
> - entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001a);
> + entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001f);
> break;
> case 0x80000001:
> entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0001_edx_x86_features;
> @@ -634,6 +634,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> break;
> case 0x8000001d:
> break;
> + case 0x8000001f:
> + break;
I guess those three case's can be unified:
case 0x8000001a:
case 0x8000001d:
case 0x8000001f:
break;
...
> + sev_info = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x8000001f, 0);
> + if (!sev_info)
> + return;
> +
> + if (ca->nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE) {
> + features->eax |= (1 << KVM_FEATURE_SEV);
> + cpuid(0x8000001f, &sev_info->eax, &sev_info->ebx,
> + &sev_info->ecx, &sev_info->edx);
> + }
Right, as already mentioned in the previous mail: can we communicate SEV
status to the guest solely through the 0x8000001f leaf? Then we won't
need KVM_FEATURE_SEV and this way we'll be hypervisor-agnostic, as Paolo
suggested.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix ImendA?rffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG NA 1/4 rnberg)
--
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-09 19:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-02 15:12 [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 0:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:42 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 0:03 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 11:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-07 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 8:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-08 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-09 19:29 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-10 11:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 22:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 10:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 10:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-17 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-17 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-18 16:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 14:05 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-06 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-06 18:37 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-04-07 11:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-07 14:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 12:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-24 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-29 15:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 17:39 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55 ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:20 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-17 11:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 11:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:38 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Brijesh Singh
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20170309192919.lt3gfqeuhlsoylu7@pd.tnic \
--to=bp@suse.de \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alexandre.bounine@idt.com \
--cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bhe@redhat.com \
--cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
--cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=devel@linuxdriverproject.org \
--cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
--cc=gary.hook@amd.com \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=jroedel@suse.de \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kuleshovmail@gmail.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=labbott@fedoraproject.org \
--cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
--cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
--cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
--cc=mchehab@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=msalter@redhat.com \
--cc=mst@redhat.com \
--cc=paul.gortmaker@windriver.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=piotr.luc@intel.com \
--cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
--cc=ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com \
--cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
--cc=simon.guinot@sequanux.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=tj@kernel.org \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=xemul@parallels.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox