From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 15:57:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161018135741.GO14666@pc.thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161018135031.GB13117@dhcp22.suse.cz>
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On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 03:50:32PM +0200, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Mon 17-10-16 11:39:49, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >
> > During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
> > not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in
> > ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
> > enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
> > unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
> >
> > This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
> > a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec,
> > so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present
> > in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
> >
> > The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
> > has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
> > This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
> > user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
>
> I haven't studied your patch too deeply but one thing that immediately
> raised a red flag was that mm might be shared between processes (aka
> thread groups).
You're conflating things. Threads always share memory, but sharing memory
doesn't imply being part of the same thread group.
> What prevents those two to sit in different user
> namespaces?
For thread groups: You can't change user namespace in a thread group
with more than one task.
For shared mm: Yeah, I think that could happen - but it doesn't matter.
The patch just needs the mm to determine the namespace in which the mm
was created, and that's always the same for tasks that share mm.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-18 13:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-10-17 16:39 Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-17 17:25 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-17 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 13:50 ` Michal Hocko
2016-10-18 13:57 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2016-10-18 14:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 15:05 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 15:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 19:12 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 21:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 21:15 ` [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 6:13 ` Amir Goldstein
2016-10-19 13:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 15:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 16:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:29 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-19 17:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 23:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 17:02 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/3] Fixing ptrace vs exec vs userns interactions Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:05 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/3] ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-18 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:08 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] exec: Don't allow ptracing an exec of an unreadable file Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 20:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 21:32 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 21:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 22:50 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 23:28 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] exec: Don't allow ptracing an exec of an unreadable file Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-18 0:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-18 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:10 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/3] exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 7:17 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/3] Fixing ptrace vs exec vs userns interactions Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 9:28 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 9:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 18:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 18:36 ` [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-18 18:06 ` [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access Michal Hocko
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