From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wm0-f72.google.com (mail-wm0-f72.google.com [74.125.82.72]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 756EE6B0286 for ; Fri, 23 Sep 2016 05:50:31 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-wm0-f72.google.com with SMTP id w84so12114996wmg.1 for ; Fri, 23 Sep 2016 02:50:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx2.suse.de (mx2.suse.de. [195.135.220.15]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id av5si6729697wjc.234.2016.09.23.02.50.30 for (version=TLS1 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Fri, 23 Sep 2016 02:50:30 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 11:50:15 +0200 From: Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Message-ID: <20160923095015.5nn52ekk2kkqixfi@pd.tnic> References: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> <147190832511.9523.10850626471583956499.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> <20160922143545.3kl7khff6vqk7b2t@pd.tnic> <443d06f5-2db5-5107-296f-94fabd209407@amd.com> <45a56110-95e9-e1f3-83ab-e777b48bf79a@redhat.com> <20160922183759.7ahw2kbxit3epnzk@pd.tnic> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Kai Huang Cc: Paolo Bonzini , Tom Lendacky , Brijesh Singh , simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com, matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com, sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com, joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, dyoung@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com, alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 09:33:00PM +1200, Kai Huang wrote: > How is this even possible? The spec clearly says under SEV only in long mode > or PAE mode guest can control whether memory is encrypted via c-bit, and in > other modes guest will be always in encrypted mode. I was suggesting the hypervisor supplies the EFI ranges unencrypted. But that is not a good idea because firmware data is exposed then, see same thread from yesterday. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix ImendA?rffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG NA 1/4 rnberg) -- -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org