From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wm0-f71.google.com (mail-wm0-f71.google.com [74.125.82.71]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6915B280256 for ; Thu, 22 Sep 2016 14:38:14 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-wm0-f71.google.com with SMTP id l138so79420521wmg.3 for ; Thu, 22 Sep 2016 11:38:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx2.suse.de (mx2.suse.de. [195.135.220.15]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id ez10si3265000wjb.247.2016.09.22.11.38.12 for (version=TLS1 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 22 Sep 2016 11:38:12 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 20:37:59 +0200 From: Borislav Petkov Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Message-ID: <20160922183759.7ahw2kbxit3epnzk@pd.tnic> References: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> <147190832511.9523.10850626471583956499.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> <20160922143545.3kl7khff6vqk7b2t@pd.tnic> <443d06f5-2db5-5107-296f-94fabd209407@amd.com> <45a56110-95e9-e1f3-83ab-e777b48bf79a@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <45a56110-95e9-e1f3-83ab-e777b48bf79a@redhat.com> Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Tom Lendacky , Brijesh Singh , simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com, matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com, sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com, joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, dyoung@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com, mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com, alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 08:23:36PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > Unless this is part of some spec, it's easier if things are the same in > SME and SEV. Yeah, I was pondering over how sprinkling sev_active checks might not be so clean. I'm wondering if we could make the EFI regions presented to the guest unencrypted too, as part of some SEV-specific init routine so that the guest kernel doesn't need to do anything different. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix ImendA?rffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG NA 1/4 rnberg) -- -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org