From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 17:57:07 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160426225707.13567.10656.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160426225553.13567.19459.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
Add to the early_memmap support to be able to specify encrypted and
un-encrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a
dirty line with this memtype.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 9 +++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h | 2 ++
mm/early_ioremap.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
index 83e91f0..4d41878 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
@@ -160,6 +160,15 @@ static inline void __set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx,
*/
#define FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE
+void __init *early_memremap_enc(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_enc_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_dec(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_dec_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+
#include <asm-generic/fixmap.h>
#define __late_set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags) __set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index fda7877..6291248 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#define _PAGE_CACHE_MASK (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)
#define _PAGE_NOCACHE (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC))
+#define _PAGE_CACHE_WP (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP))
#define PAGE_NONE __pgprot(_PAGE_PROTNONE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
#define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | \
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_USER)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PSE)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_PSE)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_CACHE_WP)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO (__PAGE_KERNEL)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE)
@@ -196,6 +198,12 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#define _KERNPG_TABLE (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP (__PAGE_KERNEL_WP | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_DEC (__PAGE_KERNEL)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_DEC_WP (__PAGE_KERNEL_WP)
+
#define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
#define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC)
#define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_ENC)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 77dadf5..14c7ed5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -420,6 +420,34 @@ void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
iounmap((void __iomem *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
}
+/* Remap memory with encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_enc(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC);
+}
+
+/* Remap memory with encryption and write-protected */
+void __init *early_memremap_enc_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP);
+}
+
+/* Remap memory without encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_dec(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_DEC);
+}
+
+/* Remap memory without encryption and write-protected */
+void __init *early_memremap_dec_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_DEC_WP);
+}
+
static pte_t bm_pte[PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(pte_t)] __page_aligned_bss;
static inline pmd_t * __init early_ioremap_pmd(unsigned long addr)
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h b/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
index 734ad4d..2edef8d 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ extern void *early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size);
extern void *early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size);
+extern void *early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size, unsigned long prot_val);
extern void early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size);
extern void early_memunmap(void *addr, unsigned long size);
diff --git a/mm/early_ioremap.c b/mm/early_ioremap.c
index 6d5717b..d71b98b 100644
--- a/mm/early_ioremap.c
+++ b/mm/early_ioremap.c
@@ -226,6 +226,14 @@ early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
}
#endif
+void __init *
+early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned long prot_val)
+{
+ return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
+ __pgprot(prot_val));
+}
+
#define MAX_MAP_CHUNK (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT)
void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
@@ -267,6 +275,13 @@ early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
return (void *)phys_addr;
}
+void __init *
+early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned long prot_val)
+{
+ return (void *)phys_addr;
+}
+
void __init early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size)
{
}
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-26 22:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-26 22:55 [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:00 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 14:58 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:47 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/18] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for AMD processors Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 14:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 14:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 15:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:01 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-27 15:30 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-27 16:41 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 17:07 ` Robin Murphy
2016-04-27 17:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:03 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 16:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/18] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/18] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:56 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/18] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/18] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/18] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/18] x86/efi: Access EFI related tables in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 13:43 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-10 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-12 18:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-24 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-25 16:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-05-25 19:30 ` Matt Fleming
2016-05-26 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 10:07 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 12:03 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 12:34 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-13 15:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-08 11:18 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-09 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-13 13:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-06-15 13:17 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-16 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-06-17 15:51 ` Matt Fleming
2016-04-26 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/18] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/18] x86: Access device tree in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/18] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 7:17 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-29 16:27 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-29 23:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/18] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/18] x86: Enable memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-05-01 22:10 ` Huang, Kai
2016-05-03 15:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/18] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:58 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/18] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:59 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/18] x86: Add support to turn on Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-03-22 13:13 ` Pavel Machek
2016-04-27 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/18] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Andy Lutomirski
2016-04-27 20:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-02 18:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-05-09 15:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-09 21:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-05-10 11:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-05-10 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-04-30 6:13 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2016-05-03 15:55 ` Tom Lendacky
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-04-26 22:45 Tom Lendacky
2016-04-26 22:46 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/18] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
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