From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] fs: clear file privilege bits when mmap writing
Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 16:03:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151203000342.GA30015@www.outflux.net> (raw)
Normally, when a user can modify a file that has setuid or setgid bits,
those bits are cleared when they are not the file owner or a member
of the group. This is enforced when using write and truncate but not
when writing to a shared mmap on the file. This could allow the file
writer to gain privileges by changing a binary without losing the
setuid/setgid/caps bits.
Changing the bits requires holding inode->i_mutex, so it cannot be done
during the page fault (due to mmap_sem being held during the fault).
Instead, clear the bits if PROT_WRITE is being used at mmap time.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
v2:
- move check from page fault to mmap open
---
mm/mmap.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 2ce04a649f6b..a27735aabc73 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1340,6 +1340,17 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
if (locks_verify_locked(file))
return -EAGAIN;
+ /*
+ * If we must remove privs, we do it here since
+ * doing it during page COW is expensive and
+ * cannot hold inode->i_mutex.
+ */
+ if (prot & PROT_WRITE && !IS_NOSEC(inode)) {
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ file_remove_privs(file);
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ }
+
vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE | VM_SHARED);
--
1.9.1
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next reply other threads:[~2015-12-03 0:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-03 0:03 Kees Cook [this message]
2015-12-03 0:18 ` Andrew Morton
2015-12-03 16:07 ` Kees Cook
2015-12-03 18:19 ` Kees Cook
2015-12-04 1:45 ` [PATCH v2] " yalin wang
2015-12-07 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2015-12-08 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2015-12-09 8:26 ` Jan Kara
2015-12-09 22:52 ` Kees Cook
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