From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux@arm.linux.org.uk,
keescook@chromium.org, mingo@kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, corbet@lwn.net,
dzickus@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, xypron.glpk@gmx.de,
jpoimboe@redhat.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com, aarcange@redhat.com, mgorman@suse.de,
tglx@linutronix.de, rientjes@google.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, salyzyn@android.com, jeffv@google.com,
nnk@google.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, hecmargi@upv.es, bp@suse.de,
dcashman@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR.
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 16:40:01 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151124164001.71844bcfb4d7a500cd25d9c6@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1447888808-31571-2-git-send-email-dcashman@android.com>
On Wed, 18 Nov 2015 15:20:05 -0800 Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -1568,6 +1568,28 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
> .mode = 0644,
> .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
> },
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
> + {
> + .procname = "mmap_rnd_bits",
> + .data = &mmap_rnd_bits,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_bits),
> + .mode = 0644,
Is there any harm in permitting the attacker to read these values?
And is there any benefit in permitting non-attackers to read them?
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> + .extra1 = &mmap_rnd_bits_min,
> + .extra2 = &mmap_rnd_bits_max,
> + },
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
> + {
> + .procname = "mmap_rnd_compat_bits",
> + .data = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_compat_bits),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> + .extra1 = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min,
> + .extra2 = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max,
> + },
> +#endif
>
> ...
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
> +int mmap_rnd_bits_min = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN;
> +int mmap_rnd_bits_max = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX;
> +int mmap_rnd_bits = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS;
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN;
> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX;
> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS;
These could be __read_mostly.
If one believes in such things. One effect of __read_mostly is to
clump the write-often stuff into the same cachelines and I've never
been convinced that one outweighs the other...
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-11-25 0:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-18 23:20 [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address Daniel Cashman
2015-11-18 23:20 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR Daniel Cashman
2015-11-18 23:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS Daniel Cashman
2015-11-18 23:20 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] arm64: " Daniel Cashman
2015-11-18 23:20 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] x86: " Daniel Cashman
2015-11-19 0:16 ` Daniel Cashman
2015-11-23 15:04 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] arm64: " Will Deacon
2015-11-23 18:55 ` Daniel Cashman
2015-11-25 4:26 ` Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 19:32 ` Daniel Cashman
2015-11-25 12:06 ` Catalin Marinas
2015-11-25 20:39 ` Daniel Cashman
2015-11-27 8:36 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2015-11-27 9:32 ` Catalin Marinas
2015-11-19 0:14 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR Daniel Cashman
2015-11-25 0:40 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2015-11-25 0:47 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 19:16 ` Daniel Cashman
2015-11-25 4:40 ` Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 19:36 ` Daniel Cashman
2015-11-25 0:39 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address Andrew Morton
2015-11-25 19:07 ` Daniel Cashman
2015-11-26 15:11 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2015-11-26 7:07 ` Michael Ellerman
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