From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
To: dave@sr71.net
Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 17/25] x86, pkeys: dump PKRU with other kernel registers
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2015 12:18:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150928191824.88E91D56@viggo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150928191817.035A64E2@viggo.jf.intel.com>
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
I'm a bit ambivalent about whether this is needed or not.
Protection Keys never affect kernel mappings. But, they can
affect whether the kernel will fault when it touches a user
mapping. But, the kernel doesn't touch user mappings without
some careful choreography and these accesses don't generally
result in oopses.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c~pkeys-30-kernel-error-dumps arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c~pkeys-30-kernel-error-dumps 2015-09-28 11:39:48.695307824 -0700
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c 2015-09-28 11:39:48.698307960 -0700
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, i
printk(KERN_DEFAULT "DR0: %016lx DR1: %016lx DR2: %016lx\n", d0, d1, d2);
printk(KERN_DEFAULT "DR3: %016lx DR6: %016lx DR7: %016lx\n", d3, d6, d7);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+ printk(KERN_DEFAULT "PKRU: %08x\n", read_pkru());
}
void release_thread(struct task_struct *dead_task)
_
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-09-28 19:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-28 19:18 [PATCH 00/25] x86: Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 02/25] x86, pkeys: Add Kconfig option Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 03/25] x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 01/25] x86, fpu: add placeholder for Processor Trace XSAVE state Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 06/25] x86, pkeys: PTE bits for storing protection key Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 04/25] x86, pku: define new CR4 bit Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 05/25] x86, pkey: add PKRU xsave fields and data structure(s) Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-10-01 17:17 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 08/25] x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 07/25] x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK Dave Hansen
2015-10-01 11:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-10-01 17:19 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 10/25] x86, pkeys: pass VMA down in to fault signal generation code Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 09/25] x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 12/25] x86, pkeys: add functions to fetch PKRU Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 13/25] mm: factor out VMA fault permission checking Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 11/25] x86, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 15/25] x86, pkeys: check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys Dave Hansen
2015-10-22 20:57 ` Jerome Glisse
2015-10-22 21:23 ` Dave Hansen
2015-10-22 22:25 ` Jerome Glisse
2015-10-23 0:49 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 14/25] mm: simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 16/25] x86, pkeys: optimize fault handling in access_error() Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 18/25] x86, pkeys: dump PTE pkey in /proc/pid/smaps Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 19/25] x86, pkeys: add Kconfig prompt to existing config option Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 20/25] mm, multi-arch: pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 21/25] mm: implement new mprotect_key() system call Dave Hansen
2015-09-29 6:39 ` Michael Ellerman
2015-09-29 14:16 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 23/25] x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 22/25] x86: wire up mprotect_key() system call Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 25/25] x86, pkeys: Documentation Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 20:34 ` Andi Kleen
2015-09-28 20:41 ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-28 19:18 ` [PATCH 24/25] x86, pkeys: add self-tests Dave Hansen
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