From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail172.messagelabs.com (mail172.messagelabs.com [216.82.254.3]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 68E726B004F for ; Thu, 2 Jul 2009 02:35:53 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2009 08:38:13 +0200 From: Pavel Machek Subject: Re: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux Message-ID: <20090702063813.GA18157@elf.ucw.cz> References: <4A4A95D8.6020708@goop.org> <79a405e4-3c4c-4194-aed4-a3832c6c5d6e@default> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <79a405e4-3c4c-4194-aed4-a3832c6c5d6e@default> Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org To: Dan Magenheimer Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, npiggin@suse.de, chris.mason@oracle.com, kurt.hackel@oracle.com, dave.mccracken@oracle.com, Avi Kivity , Rik van Riel , alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, Rusty Russell , Martin Schwidefsky , akpm@osdl.org, Marcelo Tosatti , Balbir Singh , tmem-devel@oss.oracle.com, sunil.mushran@oracle.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, Himanshu Raj , Keir Fraser List-ID: > > Yeah, a shared namespace of accessible objects is an entirely > > new thing > > in the Xen universe. I would also drop Xen support until > > there's a good > > security story about how they can be used. > > While I agree that the security is not bulletproof, I wonder > if this position might be a bit extreme. Certainly, the NSA > should not turn on tmem in a cluster, but that doesn't mean that > nobody should be allowed to. I really suspect that there are This has more problems than "just" security, and yes, security should be really solved at design time... Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org