From: "tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/mm] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 14:28:37 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <174014811760.10177.17006490943766230625.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250217163822.343400-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/mm branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 81256a50aa0fddefbf4849db8cad9f70c5167c04
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/81256a50aa0fddefbf4849db8cad9f70c5167c04
Author: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 18:38:21 +02:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 15:05:45 +01:00
x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default
Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:
memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
arch_memremap_wb()
ioremap_cache()
__ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.
Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
risky:
- It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
guest.
- Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
VMM implementation).
Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.
The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified or if the kernel runs on
a machine with SME enabled.
It fixes the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217163822.343400-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
---
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index ed580c7..1a0dc2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ extern void __iomem *ioremap_prot(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size, un
extern void __iomem *ioremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_encrypted ioremap_encrypted
+void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags);
+#define arch_memremap_wb arch_memremap_wb
+
/**
* ioremap - map bus memory into CPU space
* @offset: bus address of the memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 38ff779..42c90b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -503,6 +503,14 @@ void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iounmap);
+void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if ((flags & MEMREMAP_DEC) || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ return (void __force *)ioremap_cache(phys_addr, size);
+
+ return (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(phys_addr, size);
+}
+
/*
* Convert a physical pointer to a virtual kernel pointer for /dev/mem
* access
parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-21 14:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
[parent not found: <20250217163822.343400-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>]
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