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From: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	ira.weiny@intel.com, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: fix a data race in put_page()
Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 08:36:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1581341769.7365.25.camel@lca.pw> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANpmjNMzF-T=CzMqoJh-5zrsro8Ky7Q85tnX_HwWhsLCa0DsHw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, 2020-02-10 at 13:58 +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Mon, 10 Feb 2020 at 13:16, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > On Feb 10, 2020, at 2:48 AM, Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> > > 
> > > Here is an alternative:
> > > 
> > > Let's say KCSAN gives you this:
> > >   /* ... Assert that the bits set in mask are not written
> > > concurrently; they may still be read concurrently.
> > >     The access that immediately follows is assumed to access those
> > > bits and safe w.r.t. data races.
> > > 
> > >     For example, this may be used when certain bits of @flags may
> > > only be modified when holding the appropriate lock,
> > >     but other bits may still be modified locklessly.
> > >   ...
> > >  */
> > >   #define ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_BITS(flags, mask)   ....
> > > 
> > > Then we can write page_zonenum as follows:
> > > 
> > > static inline enum zone_type page_zonenum(const struct page *page)
> > > {
> > > +       ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_BITS(page->flags, ZONES_MASK << ZONES_PGSHIFT);
> > >        return (page->flags >> ZONES_PGSHIFT) & ZONES_MASK;
> > > }
> > > 
> > > This will accomplish the following:
> > > 1. The current code is not touched, and we do not have to verify that
> > > the change is correct without KCSAN.
> > > 2. We're not introducing a bunch of special macros to read bits in various ways.
> > > 3. KCSAN will assume that the access is safe, and no data race report
> > > is generated.
> > > 4. If somebody modifies ZONES bits concurrently, KCSAN will tell you
> > > about the race.
> > > 5. We're documenting the code.
> > > 
> > > Anything I missed?
> > 
> > I don’t know. Having to write the same line twice does not feel me any better than data_race() with commenting occasionally.
> 
> Point 4 above: While data_race() will ignore cause KCSAN to not report
> the data race, now you might be missing a real bug: if somebody
> concurrently modifies the bits accessed, you want to know about it!
> Either way, it's up to you to add the ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_BITS, but just
> remember that if you decide to silence it with data_race(), you need
> to be sure there are no concurrent writers to those bits.

Right, in this case, there is no concurrent writers to those bits, so I'll add a
comment should be sufficient. However, I'll keep ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_BITS() in mind
for other places.

> 
> There is no way to automatically infer all over the kernel which bits
> we care about, and the most reliable is to be explicit about it. I
> don't see a problem with it per se.
> 
> Thanks,
> -- Marco


  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-10 13:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-06 13:17 Qian Cai
2020-02-06 13:33 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-06 13:51   ` Qian Cai
2020-02-06 14:55   ` Jan Kara
2020-02-06 14:59     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-02-06 15:23     ` Qian Cai
2020-02-06 23:34       ` John Hubbard
2020-02-06 23:36         ` John Hubbard
2020-02-06 23:55         ` Qian Cai
2020-02-07  0:18         ` Qian Cai
2020-02-07  0:27           ` John Hubbard
2020-02-07  0:55             ` Qian Cai
2020-02-07 13:17               ` Marco Elver
2020-02-09  1:44                 ` John Hubbard
2020-02-09  3:10                   ` Qian Cai
2020-02-09  7:12                     ` John Hubbard
2020-02-10  7:48                       ` Marco Elver
2020-02-10 12:16                         ` Qian Cai
2020-02-10 12:58                           ` Marco Elver
2020-02-10 13:36                             ` Qian Cai [this message]
2020-02-10 13:38                               ` Marco Elver
2020-02-10 13:55                                 ` Qian Cai
2020-02-10 14:12                                   ` Marco Elver
2020-02-10 14:31                                     ` Qian Cai
2020-02-10 16:23                         ` Qian Cai
2020-02-10 16:33                           ` Marco Elver

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