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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/9] x86/mm: Introduce ptep_set_wrprotect_flush and related functions
Date: Thu, 07 Jun 2018 13:36:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1528403761.5265.37.camel@2b52.sc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5c39caf1-2198-3c2b-b590-8c38a525747f@linux.intel.com>

On Thu, 2018-06-07 at 13:29 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/07/2018 09:24 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
> >> +static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> >> +                                           unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
> >> +{
> >> +       bool rw;
> >> +
> >> +       rw = test_and_clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte);
> >> +       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER)) {
> >> +               struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
> >> +               pte_t pte;
> >> +
> >> +               if (rw && (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1))
> >> +                       pte = ptep_clear_flush(vma, addr, ptep);
> > Why are you clearing the pte?
> 
> I found my notes on the subject. :)
> 
> Here's the sequence that causes the problem.  This could happen any time
> we try to take a PTE from read-write to read-only.  P==Present, W=Write,
> D=Dirty:
> 
> CPU0 does a write, sees PTE with P=1,W=1,D=0
> CPU0 decides to set D=1
> CPU1 comes in and sets W=0
> CPU0 does locked operation to set D=1
> 	CPU0 sees P=1,W=0,D=0
> 	CPU0 sets back P=1,W=0,D=1
> CPU0 loads P=1,W=0,D=1 into the TLB
> CPU0 attempts to continue the write, but sees W=0 in the TLB and a #PF
> is generated because of the write fault.
> 
> The problem with this is that we end up with a shadowstack-PTE
> (Write=0,Dirty=1) where we didn't want one.  This, unfortunately,
> imposes extra TLB flushing overhead on the R/W->R/O transitions that
> does not exist before shadowstack enabling.
> 
> Yu-cheng, could you please add this to the patch description?

I will add that.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-06-07 20:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-07 14:36 [PATCH 0/9] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (2) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:36 ` [PATCH 1/9] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 15:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:23     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08  4:17   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08  4:18   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:36 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/cet: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 15:47   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 15:58     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:28       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 14:36 ` [PATCH 3/9] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 4/9] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08  3:53   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 5/9] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08  5:15   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86/mm: Introduce ptep_set_wrprotect_flush and related functions Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:24   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:21     ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 18:24       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:29     ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 20:36       ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-06-08  0:59       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08  1:20         ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-08  4:43   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-08 14:13   ` kbuild test robot
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:26   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:46     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:56     ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 8/9] x86/cet: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 9/9] x86/cet: Handle THP/HugeTLB shadow stack page copying Yu-cheng Yu

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