From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-wr0-f198.google.com (mail-wr0-f198.google.com [209.85.128.198]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B70E6B0356 for ; Wed, 3 Jan 2018 09:32:13 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-wr0-f198.google.com with SMTP id w18so911540wra.5 for ; Wed, 03 Jan 2018 06:32:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx01.bbu.dsd.mx.bitdefender.com (mx01.bbu.dsd.mx.bitdefender.com. [91.199.104.161]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id j9si887194wrc.162.2018.01.03.06.32.11 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 03 Jan 2018 06:32:12 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp01.buh.bitdefender.com (smtp.bitdefender.biz [10.17.80.75]) by mx-sr.buh.bitdefender.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5D247FC04 for ; Wed, 3 Jan 2018 16:32:10 +0200 (EET) Message-ID: <1514989930.2751.33.camel@bitdefender.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/18] VM introspection From: Mihai =?UTF-8?Q?Don=C8=9Bu?= Date: Wed, 03 Jan 2018 16:32:10 +0200 In-Reply-To: <310d60aa-9979-cb73-058d-831ca6b98dfa@gmail.com> References: <20171218190642.7790-1-alazar@bitdefender.com> <310d60aa-9979-cb73-058d-831ca6b98dfa@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Xiao Guangrong , Adalber =?UTF-8?Q?Laz=C4=83r?= , kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, Paolo Bonzini , Radim =?UTF-8?Q?Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= , Xiao Guangrong On Wed, 2018-01-03 at 11:34 +0800, Xiao Guangrong wrote: > On 12/19/2017 03:06 AM, Adalber LazA?r wrote: > > From: Adalbert Lazar > > > > This patch series proposes a VM introspection subsystem for KVM (KVMI). > > > > The previous RFC can be read here: https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=150514457912721 > > > > These patches were tested on kvm/master, > > commit 43aabca38aa9668eee3c3c1206207034614c0901 (Merge tag 'kvm-arm-fixes-for-v4.15-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD). > > > > In this iteration we refactored the code based on the feedback received > > from Paolo and others. > > I am thinking if we can define some check points in KVM where > BPF programs are allowed to attach, then employ the policies > in BPFs instead... That would be a nice feature to have. For example, we could use it to pre-filter the events (eg. drop EPT #PF events generated by A/D bit updates). Also, sure, given how BPF has evolved in Linux these past few years (see JIT) we could upload some pretty complex introspection logic. Regards, -- Mihai DonE?u -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org