From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 25/31] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 13:45:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1505940337-79069-26-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1505940337-79069-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
thread_stack slab caches in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
Since the entire thread_stack needs to be available to userspace, the
entire slab contents are whitelisted. Note that the slab-based thread
stack is only present on systems with THREAD_SIZE < PAGE_SIZE and
!CONFIG_VMAP_STACK.
cache object allocation:
kernel/fork.c:
alloc_thread_stack_node(...):
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_stack_cache, ...)
dup_task_struct(...):
...
stack = alloc_thread_stack_node(...)
...
tsk->stack = stack;
copy_process(...):
...
dup_task_struct(...)
_do_fork(...):
...
copy_process(...)
This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed memory
falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
---
I wasn't able to test this, so anyone with a system that can try running
with a large PAGE_SIZE and without VMAP_STACK would be appreciated.
---
kernel/fork.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index dc1437f8b702..720109dc723a 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -278,8 +278,9 @@ static void free_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
void thread_stack_cache_init(void)
{
- thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create("thread_stack", THREAD_SIZE,
- THREAD_SIZE, 0, NULL);
+ thread_stack_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("thread_stack",
+ THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_SIZE, 0, 0,
+ THREAD_SIZE, NULL);
BUG_ON(thread_stack_cache == NULL);
}
# endif
--
2.7.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-20 20:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-20 20:45 [PATCH v3 00/31] Hardened usercopy whitelisting Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 01/31] usercopy: Prepare for " Kees Cook
2017-09-21 15:21 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 02/31] usercopy: Enforce slab cache usercopy region boundaries Kees Cook
2017-09-21 15:23 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 03/31] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches Kees Cook
2017-09-21 15:27 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-09-21 15:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-09-21 16:04 ` Christopher Lameter
2017-09-21 18:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 04/31] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 05/31] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 06/31] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 07/31] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 08/31] ext2: Define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 09/31] jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip " Kees Cook
2017-09-22 2:54 ` Dave Kleikamp
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 10/31] befs: Define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-09-21 9:34 ` Luis de Bethencourt
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 11/31] exofs: Define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 12/31] orangefs: Define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 13/31] ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 14/31] vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-20 21:21 ` Kees Cook
2017-09-20 23:22 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 15/31] xfs: Define usercopy region in xfs_inode " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 16/31] cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 17/31] scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 18/31] net: Define usercopy region in struct proto " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 19/31] ip: Define usercopy region in IP " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 20/31] caif: Define usercopy region in caif " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 21/31] sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 22/31] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 23/31] net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 24/31] fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 26/31] fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 27/31] x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 28/31] arm64: " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 29/31] arm: " Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 30/31] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 Kees Cook
2017-09-20 20:45 ` [PATCH v3 31/31] lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting Kees Cook
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