From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
To: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
arnd@arndb.de, hannes@cmpxchg.org, kirill@shutemov.name,
mgorman@techsingularity.net, hughd@google.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [RESENT PATCH] x86/mem: fix the offset overflow when read/write mem
Date: Tue, 09 May 2017 11:46:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1494344803.20270.27.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <590A91DF.8030004@huawei.com>
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On Thu, 2017-05-04 at 10:28 +0800, zhong jiang wrote:
> On 2017/5/4 2:46, Rik van Riel wrote:
> > However, it is not as easy as simply checking the
> > end against __pa(high_memory). Some systems have
> > non-contiguous physical memory ranges, with gaps
> > of invalid addresses in-between.
>
> The invalid physical address means that it is used as
> io mapped. not in system ram region. /dev/mem is not
> access to them , is it right?
Not necessarily. Some systems simply have large
gaps in physical memory access. Their memory map
may look like this:
|MMMMMM|IO|MMMM|..................|MMMMMMMM|
Where M is memory, IO is IO space, and the
dots are simply a gap in physical address
space with no valid accesses at all.
> > At that point, is the complexity so much that it no
> > longer makes sense to try to protect against root
> > crashing the system?
> >
>
> your suggestion is to let the issue along without any protection.
> just root user know what they are doing.
Well, root already has other ways to crash the system.
Implementing validation on /dev/mem may make sense if
it can be done in a simple way, but may not be worth
it if it becomes too complex.
--
All rights reversed
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-09 15:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-27 11:49 zhongjiang
2017-05-02 1:47 ` zhong jiang
2017-05-02 20:54 ` David Rientjes
2017-05-03 6:42 ` zhong jiang
2017-05-03 18:46 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-04 2:28 ` zhong jiang
2017-05-09 15:46 ` Rik van Riel [this message]
2017-05-10 2:14 ` zhong jiang
2017-05-10 2:15 ` Xishi Qiu
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