On Wed, 2016-11-09 at 18:36 -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system
> is booted and needs to be accessed unencrypted.  Add support to apply
> the proper attributes to the EFI page tables and to the
> early_memremap and memremap APIs to identify the type of data being
> accessed so that the proper encryption attribute can be applied.
 :
> +static bool memremap_apply_encryption(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> +				      unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	/* SME is not active, just return true */
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return true;
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is part of the setup data */
> +	if (memremap_setup_data(phys_addr, size))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
> +	switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
> +	case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
> +	case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
> +	switch (e820_get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size -
> 1)) {
> +	case E820_RESERVED:
> +	case E820_ACPI:
> +	case E820_NVS:
> +	case E820_UNUSABLE:
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	return true;
> +}

Are you supporting encryption for E820_PMEM ranges?  If so, this
encryption will persist across a reboot and does not need to be
encrypted again, right?  Also, how do you keep a same key across a
reboot?

Thanks,
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