From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] swapfile: fix memory corruption via malformed swapfile
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 22:32:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1477949533-2509-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net> (raw)
When root activates a swap partition whose header has the wrong endianness,
nr_badpages elements of badpages are swabbed before nr_badpages has been
checked, leading to a buffer overrun of up to 8GB.
This normally is not a security issue because it can only be exploited by
root (more specifically, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN or the ability to
modify a swap file/partition), and such a process can already e.g. modify
swapped-out memory of any other userspace process on the system.
Testcase for reproducing the bug (must be run as root, should crash your
kernel):
=================
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/swap.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
#define __u32 unsigned int
// from include/linux/swap.h
union swap_header {
struct {
char reserved[PAGE_SIZE - 10];
char magic[10]; /* SWAP-SPACE or SWAPSPACE2 */
} magic;
struct {
char bootbits[1024]; /* Space for disklabel etc. */
__u32 version;
__u32 last_page;
__u32 nr_badpages;
unsigned char sws_uuid[16];
unsigned char sws_volume[16];
__u32 padding[117];
__u32 badpages[1];
} info;
};
int main(void) {
char file[] = "/tmp/swapfile.XXXXXX";
int file_fd = mkstemp(file);
if (file_fd == -1)
err(1, "mkstemp");
if (ftruncate(file_fd, PAGE_SIZE))
err(1, "ftruncate");
union swap_header swap_header = {
.info = {
.version = __builtin_bswap32(1),
.nr_badpages = __builtin_bswap32(INT_MAX)
}
};
memcpy(swap_header.magic.magic, "SWAPSPACE2", 10);
if (write(file_fd, &swap_header, sizeof(swap_header)) !=
sizeof(swap_header))
err(1, "write");
// not because the attack needs it, just in case you forgot to
// sync yourself before crashing your machine
sync();
// now die
if (swapon(file, 0))
err(1, "swapon");
puts("huh, we survived");
if (swapoff(file))
err(1, "swapoff");
unlink(file);
}
=================
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
---
mm/swapfile.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c
index 2210de290b54..f30438970cd1 100644
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -2224,6 +2224,8 @@ static unsigned long read_swap_header(struct swap_info_struct *p,
swab32s(&swap_header->info.version);
swab32s(&swap_header->info.last_page);
swab32s(&swap_header->info.nr_badpages);
+ if (swap_header->info.nr_badpages > MAX_SWAP_BADPAGES)
+ return 0;
for (i = 0; i < swap_header->info.nr_badpages; i++)
swab32s(&swap_header->info.badpages[i]);
}
--
2.1.4
--
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next reply other threads:[~2016-10-31 21:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-10-31 21:32 Jann Horn [this message]
2016-10-31 22:36 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-01 9:10 ` Jerome Marchand
2016-11-04 14:57 ` Johannes Weiner
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