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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, paul.gortmaker@windriver.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de,
	dyoung@redhat.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, jroedel@suse.de,
	keescook@chromium.org, toshi.kani@hpe.com,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, devel@linuxdriverproject.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mchehab@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,
	labbott@fedoraproject.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
	alexandre.bounine@idt.com, kuleshovmail@gmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrof@kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:25:25 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190832511.9523.10850626471583956499.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the
page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed
encrypted.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 0871ea4..98363f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ void efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(void)
 
 int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 {
-	unsigned long pfn, text;
+	unsigned long pfn, text, flags;
 	efi_memory_desc_t *md;
 	struct page *page;
 	unsigned npages;
@@ -230,6 +230,10 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 	efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__sme_pa(efi_pgd);
 	pgd = efi_pgd;
 
+	flags = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW;
+	if (sev_active)
+		flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
 	/*
 	 * It can happen that the physical address of new_memmap lands in memory
 	 * which is not mapped in the EFI page table. Therefore we need to go
@@ -237,7 +241,7 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
 	 * phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map().
 	 */
 	pfn = pa_memmap >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW)) {
+	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, flags)) {
 		pr_err("Error ident-mapping new memmap (0x%lx)!\n", pa_memmap);
 		return 1;
 	}
@@ -302,6 +306,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
 	if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
 		flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
 
+	if (sev_active)
+		flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
 	pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags))
 		pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n",
@@ -426,6 +433,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
 			(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
 			pf |= _PAGE_RW;
 
+		if (sev_active)
+			pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
+
 		/* Update the 1:1 mapping */
 		pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 		if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, md->num_pages, pf))

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-22 23:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13  9:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2016-09-22 14:35   ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10                   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23  9:33           ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:50             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23  7:14   ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51   ` Brijesh Singh

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