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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: simon.guinot@sequanux.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
	matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, linus.walleij@linaro.org,
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	sfr@canb.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
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	joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	msalter@redhat.com, ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, bp@suse.de,
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	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:23:44 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190822443.9523.7814744422402462127.stgit@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

AMD hardware adds two additional bits to aid in nested page fault handling.

Bit 32 - NPF occurred while translating the guest's final physical address
Bit 33 - NPF occurred while translating the guest page tables

The guest page tables fault indicator can be used as an aid for nested
virtualization. Using V0 for the host, V1 for the first level guest and
V2 for the second level guest, when both V1 and V2 are using nested paging
there are currently a number of unnecessary instruction emulations. When
V2 is launched shadow paging is used in V1 for the nested tables of V2. As
a result, KVM marks these pages as RO in the host nested page tables. When
V2 exits and we resume V1, these pages are still marked RO.

Every nested walk for a guest page table is treated as a user-level write
access and this causes a lot of NPFs because the V1 page tables are marked
RO in the V0 nested tables. While executing V1, when these NPFs occur KVM
sees a write to a read-only page, emulates the V1 instruction and unprotects
the page (marking it RW). This patch looks for cases where we get a NPF due
to a guest page table walk where the page was marked RO. It immediately
unprotects the page and resumes the guest, leading to far fewer instruction
emulations when nested virtualization is used.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   11 ++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c              |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index c51c1cb..3f05d36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ enum {
 #define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3
 #define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4
 #define PFERR_PK_BIT 5
+#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32
+#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33
 
 #define PFERR_PRESENT_MASK (1U << PFERR_PRESENT_BIT)
 #define PFERR_WRITE_MASK (1U << PFERR_WRITE_BIT)
@@ -198,6 +200,13 @@ enum {
 #define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT)
 #define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT)
 #define PFERR_PK_MASK (1U << PFERR_PK_BIT)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT)
+
+#define PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK |	\
+				 PFERR_USER_MASK |		\
+				 PFERR_WRITE_MASK |		\
+				 PFERR_PRESENT_MASK)
 
 /* apic attention bits */
 #define KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC	0
@@ -1203,7 +1212,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_deactivate_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
-int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u32 error_code,
+int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, u64 error_code,
 		       void *insn, int insn_len);
 void kvm_mmu_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva);
 void kvm_mmu_new_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index a7040f4..3b47a5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -4512,7 +4512,7 @@ static void make_mmu_pages_available(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(vcpu->kvm, &invalid_list);
 }
 
-int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t cr2, u32 error_code,
+int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t cr2, u64 error_code,
 		       void *insn, int insn_len)
 {
 	int r, emulation_type = EMULTYPE_RETRY;
@@ -4531,12 +4531,28 @@ int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t cr2, u32 error_code,
 			return r;
 	}
 
-	r = vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, false);
+	r = vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault(vcpu, cr2, lower_32_bits(error_code),
+				      false);
 	if (r < 0)
 		return r;
 	if (!r)
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Before emulating the instruction, check if the error code
+	 * was due to a RO violation while translating the guest page.
+	 * This can occur when using nested virtualization with nested
+	 * paging in both guests. If true, we simply unprotect the page
+	 * and resume the guest.
+	 *
+	 * Note: AMD only (since it supports the PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK used
+	 *       in PFERR_NEXT_GUEST_PAGE)
+	 */
+	if (error_code == PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE) {
+		kvm_mmu_unprotect_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(cr2));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	if (mmio_info_in_cache(vcpu, cr2, direct))
 		emulation_type = 0;
 emulate:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 1e6b84b..d8b9c8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@ static void svm_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
 static int pf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	u64 fault_address = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
-	u32 error_code;
+	u64 error_code;
 	int r = 1;
 
 	switch (svm->apf_reason) {

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-22 23:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2016-09-13  9:56   ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10                   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23  9:33           ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:50             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23  7:14   ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51   ` Brijesh Singh

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