From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] x86/kasan: write protect kasan zero shadow
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:51:19 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1452516679-32040-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page,
so write protect it.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 303e470..1b1110f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -125,10 +125,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
/*
* kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
- * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
- * no one should write to it.
+ * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
+ * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
*/
memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+ for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+ pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+ set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
+ }
+ /* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
+ __flush_tlb_all();
init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
--
2.4.10
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-11 12:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-08 23:15 [RFC 00/13] x86/mm: PCID and INVPCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 01/13] x86/paravirt: Turn KASAN off for parvirt.o Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-10 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-01-11 12:51 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2016-01-11 12:51 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/kasan: clear kasan_zero_page after TLB flush Andrey Ryabinin
2016-01-18 22:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-11 12:51 ` Andrey Ryabinin [this message]
2016-01-18 22:24 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/kasan: write protect kasan zero shadow Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-29 10:35 ` [RFC 01/13] x86/paravirt: Turn KASAN off for parvirt.o Borislav Petkov
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 02/13] x86/mm: Add INVPCID helpers Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 03/13] x86/mm: Add a noinvpcid option to turn off INVPCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 04/13] x86/mm: If INVPCID is available, use it to flush global mappings Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 05/13] x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm-vs-flush synchronization Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-03 17:42 ` Nadav Amit
2016-06-09 17:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-09 19:45 ` Nadav Amit
2016-09-06 1:22 ` Wanpeng Li
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 06/13] x86/mm: Disable PCID on 32-bit kernels Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 07/13] x86/mm: Add nopcid to turn off PCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 08/13] x86/mm: Teach CR3 readers about PCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 09/13] x86/mm: Disable interrupts when flushing the TLB using CR3 Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-01-09 0:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-09 2:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-01-11 10:51 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-01-13 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-13 23:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-13 23:43 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-13 23:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-13 23:56 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-14 0:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 10/13] x86/mm: Factor out remote TLB flushing Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 11/13] x86/mm: Build arch/x86/mm/tlb.c even on !SMP Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:55 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 12/13] x86/mm: Uninline switch_mm Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:15 ` [RFC 13/13] x86/mm: Try to preserve old TLB entries using PCID Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-09 0:27 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-09 2:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:31 ` [RFC 00/13] x86/mm: PCID and INVPCID Linus Torvalds
2016-01-08 23:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-01-08 23:42 ` Linus Torvalds
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