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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com,
	vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com,
	rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com,
	bp@alien8.de, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
	ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
	jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 09/29] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support
Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 20:58:43 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1296cfd8-3986-4c2f-be94-771ae3fb84f2@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240329225835.400662-10-michael.roth@amd.com>

On 3/29/24 23:58, Michael Roth wrote:
> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
> new hardware-based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
> encryption and integrity protection to help prevent malicious
> hypervisor-based attacks such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and
> more, to create an isolated execution environment.
> 
> Define a new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type which makes use of these capabilities
> and extend the KVM_SEV_INIT2 ioctl to support it. Also add a basic
> helper to check whether SNP is enabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> [mdr: commit fixups, use similar ASID reporting as with SEV/SEV-ES]
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h      |  3 ++-
>   arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  1 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c          | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  3 ++-
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h          | 12 ++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  2 +-
>   6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index 728c98175b9c..544a43c1cf11 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
>   
>   #define AVIC_HPA_MASK	~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF)
>   
> -#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP                        BIT(5)
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE				BIT(0)
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP				BIT(5)
>   
>   struct vmcb_seg {
>   	u16 selector;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> index 51b13080ed4b..725b75cfe9ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> @@ -868,5 +868,6 @@ struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {
>   #define KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM	1
>   #define KVM_X86_SEV_VM		2
>   #define KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM	3
> +#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM		4
>   
>   #endif /* _ASM_X86_KVM_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 1e65f5634ad3..3d9771163562 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
>   static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
>   module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
>   
> +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */
> +static bool sev_snp_enabled;
> +
>   /* enable/disable SEV-ES DebugSwap support */
>   static bool sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = true;
>   module_param_named(debug_swap, sev_es_debug_swap_enabled, bool, 0444);
> @@ -275,6 +278,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
>   	sev->es_active = es_active;
>   	sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features;
>   
> +	if (vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
> +		sev->vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
> +
>   	ret = sev_asid_new(sev);
>   	if (ret)
>   		goto e_no_asid;
> @@ -326,7 +332,8 @@ static int sev_guest_init2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   
>   	if (kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_VM &&
> -	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM)
> +	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM &&
> +	    kvm->arch.vm_type != KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
>   		return -EINVAL;
>   
>   	if (copy_from_user(&data, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(data)))
> @@ -2297,11 +2304,16 @@ void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
>   		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
>   		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
>   	}
> +	if (sev_snp_enabled) {
> +		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
> +		kvm_caps.supported_vm_types |= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
> +	}
>   }
>   
>   void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   {
>   	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
> +	bool sev_snp_supported = false;
>   	bool sev_es_supported = false;
>   	bool sev_supported = false;
>   
> @@ -2382,6 +2394,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   	sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
>   	WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
>   	sev_es_supported = true;
> +	sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
>   
>   out:
>   	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
> @@ -2394,9 +2407,15 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>   		pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
>   			sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
>   			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> +		pr_info("SEV-SNP %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
> +			sev_snp_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
> +			min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
>   
>   	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
>   	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
> +	sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported;
> +
>   	if (!sev_es_enabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP) ||
>   	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
>   		sev_es_debug_swap_enabled = false;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 0f3b59da0d4a..2c162f6a1d78 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -4890,7 +4890,8 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
>   
>   	if (type != KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM &&
>   	    type != KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM) {
> -		kvm->arch.has_protected_state = (type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
> +		kvm->arch.has_protected_state =
> +			(type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
>   		to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true;
>   	}
>   
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 157eb3f65269..4a01a81dd9b9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -348,6 +348,18 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
>   #endif
>   }
>   
> +static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> +	return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) &&
> +	       !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_es_guest(kvm));
> +#else
> +	return false;
> +#endif
> +}
> +
>   static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
>   {
>   	vmcb->control.clean = 0;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 64eda7949f09..f85735b6235d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -12603,7 +12603,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
>   
>   	kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
>   	kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
> -		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
> +		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM || type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
>   
>   	ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
>   	if (ret)

Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Paolo



  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-30 19:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-29 22:58 [PATCH v12 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 01/29] [TEMP] x86/kvm/Kconfig: Have KVM_AMD_SEV select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 02/29] [TEMP] x86/cc: Add cc_platform_set/_clear() helpers Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 03/29] [TEMP] x86/CPU/AMD: Track SNP host status with cc_platform_*() Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 04/29] [TEMP] fixup! KVM: SEV: sync FPU and AVX state at LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA time Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 05/29] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2024-03-30 19:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 06/29] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 07/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 08/29] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 09/29] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-03-30 19:58   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 10/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 11/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
     [not found]   ` <8c3685a6-833c-4b3c-83f4-c0bd78bba36e@redhat.com>
2024-04-01 22:22     ` Michael Roth
2024-04-02 22:58       ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-04-03 12:51         ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-03 15:37           ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 12/29] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
     [not found]   ` <40382494-7253-442b-91a8-e80c38fb4f2c@redhat.com>
2024-04-01 23:17     ` Michael Roth
2024-04-03 12:56       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 13/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 14/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 15/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 16/29] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 17/29] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-03-30 20:55   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 18/29] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 11:53     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-16 14:25       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-04-16 17:00         ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-17 20:57       ` Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 19/29] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 20/29] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 21/29] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:05   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 22/29] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:31   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 19:57     ` Michael Roth
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 23/29] KVM: x86: Implement gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:35   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 24/29] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:35   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 25/29] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-03-30 21:35   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 26/29] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-04-10 22:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 27/29] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-04-10 22:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 28/29] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{PAUSE,RESUME}_ATTESTATION commands Michael Roth
2024-04-10 22:27   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-29 22:58 ` [PATCH v12 29/29] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-04-11 13:33   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-30 21:44 ` [PATCH v12 00/29] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini

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