From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Subject: Re: [PATCH/RFC] Shared page tables From: Arjan van de Ven In-Reply-To: References: <200601240139.46751.ak@suse.de> <200601231853.54948.raybry@mpdtxmail.amd.com> <200601240210.04337.ak@suse.de> <1138086398.2977.19.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> Content-Type: text/plain Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2006 15:56:49 +0100 Message-Id: <1138114609.2977.45.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Return-Path: To: Dave McCracken Cc: Andi Kleen , Ray Bryant , Robin Holt , Hugh Dickins , Linux Kernel , Linux Memory Management List-ID: > I thought the main security benefit for randomization of mapped regions was > for writeable data space anyway. Isn't text space protected by not being > writeable? nope that's not correct. Aside from stack randomization, randomization is to a large degree intended to make the return-to-libc kind of attacks harder, by not giving attackers a fixed address to return to. That's all code, nothing to do with data. -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: email@kvack.org