From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "Schofield, Alison" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
"Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Sakkinen, Jarkko" <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>,
"jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: RE: [RFC 10/12] x86/pconfig: Program memory encryption keys on a system-wide basis
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2018 01:46:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <105F7BF4D0229846AF094488D65A0989354249D2@PGSMSX112.gar.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0947e4ad711e8b7c1f581a446e808f514620b49b.1536356108.git.alison.schofield@intel.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Schofield, Alison
> Sent: Saturday, September 8, 2018 10:38 AM
> To: dhowells@redhat.com; tglx@linutronix.de
> Cc: Huang, Kai <kai.huang@intel.com>; Nakajima, Jun
> <jun.nakajima@intel.com>; Shutemov, Kirill <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>;
> Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen@intel.com>; Sakkinen, Jarkko
> <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>; jmorris@namei.org; keyrings@vger.kernel.org;
> linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org; mingo@redhat.com; hpa@zytor.com;
> x86@kernel.org; linux-mm@kvack.org
> Subject: [RFC 10/12] x86/pconfig: Program memory encryption keys on a
> system-wide basis
>
> The kernel manages the MKTME (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) Keys as a
> system wide single pool of keys. The hardware, however, manages the keys on a
> per physical package basis. Each physical package maintains a key table that all
> CPU's in that package share.
>
> In order to maintain the consistent, system wide view that the kernel requires,
> program all physical packages during a key program request.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h | 42
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h
> b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h
> index 3cb002b1d0f9..d3bf0a297e89 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel_pconfig.h
> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
>
> #include <asm/asm.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> +#include <linux/cpu.h>
>
> enum pconfig_target {
> INVALID_TARGET = 0,
> @@ -47,19 +48,48 @@ struct mktme_key_program {
> u8 key_field_2[64];
> } __packed __aligned(256);
>
> -static inline int mktme_key_program(struct mktme_key_program
> *key_program)
> +struct mktme_key_program_info {
> + struct mktme_key_program *key_program;
> + unsigned long status;
> +};
> +
> +static void mktme_package_program(void *key_program_info)
> {
> + struct mktme_key_program_info *info = key_program_info;
> unsigned long rax = MKTME_KEY_PROGRAM;
>
> + asm volatile(PCONFIG
> + : "=a" (rax), "=b" (info->key_program)
Why do we need "=b" (info->key_program)? To me PCONFIG only reads from rbx, but won't write to it.
> + : "0" (rax), "1" (info->key_program)
> + : "memory", "cc");
> +
> + if (rax != MKTME_PROG_SUCCESS)
> + WRITE_ONCE(info->status, rax);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * MKTME keys are managed as a system-wide single pool of keys.
> + * In the hardware, each physical package maintains a separate key
> + * table. Program all physical packages with the same key info to
> + * maintain that system-wide kernel view.
> + */
> +static inline int mktme_key_program(struct mktme_key_program
> *key_program,
> + cpumask_var_t mktme_cpumask)
> +{
> + struct mktme_key_program_info info = {
> + .key_program = key_program,
> + .status = MKTME_PROG_SUCCESS,
> + };
> +
> if (!pconfig_target_supported(MKTME_TARGET))
> return -ENXIO;
>
> - asm volatile(PCONFIG
> - : "=a" (rax), "=b" (key_program)
> - : "0" (rax), "1" (key_program)
> - : "memory", "cc");
> + get_online_cpus();
> + on_each_cpu_mask(mktme_cpumask, mktme_package_program,
> + &info, 1);
> + put_online_cpus();
What is the value of 'mktme_cpumask'? Does it only contain one core for each package?
Since we are using 'on_each_cpu_mask', I think we should make sure only one core is set for each node in 'mktme_cpumask'. Otherwise we have to deal with 'DEVICE_BUSY' case, since if one core is already in middle of PCONFIG, the other PCONFIGs on the same node would get 'DEVICE_BUSY' error, but this doesn't mean PCONFIG has failed on that node.
Thanks,
-Kai
>
> - return rax;
> + return info.status;
> }
>
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_INTEL_PCONFIG_H */
> --
> 2.14.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-10 1:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-07 22:23 [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 01/12] docs/x86: Document the Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API Alison Schofield
2018-09-08 18:44 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-10 1:28 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:13 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 0:33 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:45 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 1:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-11 0:14 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:32 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 0:19 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 02/12] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 10:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 0:34 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:34 ` [RFC 03/12] syscall/x86: Wire up a new system call for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 2:56 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:37 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 23:41 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:37 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 05/12] x86/mm: Add a helper function to set keyid bits in encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 17:57 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-07 22:36 ` [RFC 06/12] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 2:15 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 07/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to track encrypted VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 3:17 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 08/12] mm: Track VMA's in use for each memory encryption keyid Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-11 2:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-07 22:37 ` [RFC 09/12] mm: Restrict memory encryption to anonymous VMA's Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 18:21 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-10 18:57 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-10 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-10 21:09 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 10/12] x86/pconfig: Program memory encryption keys on a system-wide basis Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 1:46 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2018-09-10 18:24 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 2:46 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-09-07 22:38 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 3:29 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 21:47 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-15 0:06 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-17 10:48 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-17 22:34 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-07 22:39 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " Alison Schofield
2018-09-10 1:10 ` [RFC 00/12] Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption API (MKTME) Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 19:10 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 3:15 ` Huang, Kai
2018-09-10 17:29 ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2018-09-11 22:03 ` [RFC 11/12] keys/mktme: Add a new key service type for memory encryption keys David Howells
2018-09-11 22:39 ` Alison Schofield
2018-09-11 23:01 ` David Howells
2018-09-11 22:56 ` [RFC 04/12] x86/mm: Add helper functions to manage " David Howells
2018-09-12 11:12 ` [RFC 12/12] keys/mktme: Do not revoke in use " David Howells
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