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[91.12.103.71]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-4316f58c125sm67863795e9.26.2024.10.21.14.20.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 21 Oct 2024 14:20:06 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <0f7a6b69-5706-4010-ba7a-68a071922c80@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 23:20:03 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page mechanism To: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Vlastimil Babka , Andrew Morton , Suren Baghdasaryan , "Liam R . Howlett" , Matthew Wilcox , "Paul E . McKenney" , Jann Horn , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Muchun Song , Richard Henderson , Ivan Kokshaysky , Matt Turner , Thomas Bogendoerfer , "James E . J . Bottomley" , Helge Deller , Chris Zankel , Max Filippov , Arnd Bergmann , linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Shuah Khan , Christian Brauner , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Sidhartha Kumar , Jeff Xu , Christoph Hellwig , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, John Hubbard References: <6c282299-506f-45c9-9ddc-9ef4de582394@redhat.com> <9727ada4-0048-499b-a43f-ac0a625bae5d@redhat.com> <73134e10-19eb-4e52-b87f-5fbfd322b575@lucifer.local> From: David Hildenbrand Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; keydata= xsFNBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABzSREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT7CwZgEEwEIAEICGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQW AgMBAh4BAheAAhkBFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl8Ox4kFCRKpKXgACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1oHcA//a6Tj7SBNjFNM1iNhWUo1lxAja0lpSodSnB2g4FCZ4R61SBR4l/psBL73xktp rDHrx4aSpwkRP6Epu6mLvhlfjmkRG4OynJ5HG1gfv7RJJfnUdUM1z5kdS8JBrOhMJS2c/gPf wv1TGRq2XdMPnfY2o0CxRqpcLkx4vBODvJGl2mQyJF/gPepdDfcT8/PY9BJ7FL6Hrq1gnAo4 3Iv9qV0JiT2wmZciNyYQhmA1V6dyTRiQ4YAc31zOo2IM+xisPzeSHgw3ONY/XhYvfZ9r7W1l pNQdc2G+o4Di9NPFHQQhDw3YTRR1opJaTlRDzxYxzU6ZnUUBghxt9cwUWTpfCktkMZiPSDGd KgQBjnweV2jw9UOTxjb4LXqDjmSNkjDdQUOU69jGMUXgihvo4zhYcMX8F5gWdRtMR7DzW/YE BgVcyxNkMIXoY1aYj6npHYiNQesQlqjU6azjbH70/SXKM5tNRplgW8TNprMDuntdvV9wNkFs 9TyM02V5aWxFfI42+aivc4KEw69SE9KXwC7FSf5wXzuTot97N9Phj/Z3+jx443jo2NR34XgF 89cct7wJMjOF7bBefo0fPPZQuIma0Zym71cP61OP/i11ahNye6HGKfxGCOcs5wW9kRQEk8P9 M/k2wt3mt/fCQnuP/mWutNPt95w9wSsUyATLmtNrwccz63XOwU0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAHCwXwEGAEIACYCGwwWIQQb2cqtc1xMOkYN/MpN3hD3 AP+DWgUCXw7HsgUJEqkpoQAKCRBN3hD3AP+DWrrpD/4qS3dyVRxDcDHIlmguXjC1Q5tZTwNB boaBTPHSy/Nksu0eY7x6HfQJ3xajVH32Ms6t1trDQmPx2iP5+7iDsb7OKAb5eOS8h+BEBDeq 3ecsQDv0fFJOA9ag5O3LLNk+3x3q7e0uo06XMaY7UHS341ozXUUI7wC7iKfoUTv03iO9El5f XpNMx/YrIMduZ2+nd9Di7o5+KIwlb2mAB9sTNHdMrXesX8eBL6T9b+MZJk+mZuPxKNVfEQMQ a5SxUEADIPQTPNvBewdeI80yeOCrN+Zzwy/Mrx9EPeu59Y5vSJOx/z6OUImD/GhX7Xvkt3kq Er5KTrJz3++B6SH9pum9PuoE/k+nntJkNMmQpR4MCBaV/J9gIOPGodDKnjdng+mXliF3Ptu6 3oxc2RCyGzTlxyMwuc2U5Q7KtUNTdDe8T0uE+9b8BLMVQDDfJjqY0VVqSUwImzTDLX9S4g/8 kC4HRcclk8hpyhY2jKGluZO0awwTIMgVEzmTyBphDg/Gx7dZU1Xf8HFuE+UZ5UDHDTnwgv7E th6RC9+WrhDNspZ9fJjKWRbveQgUFCpe1sa77LAw+XFrKmBHXp9ZVIe90RMe2tRL06BGiRZr jPrnvUsUUsjRoRNJjKKA/REq+sAnhkNPPZ/NNMjaZ5b8Tovi8C0tmxiCHaQYqj7G2rgnT0kt WNyWQQ== Organization: Red Hat In-Reply-To: <73134e10-19eb-4e52-b87f-5fbfd322b575@lucifer.local> X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Language: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: C9633180018 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam01 X-Stat-Signature: 19g3p9m81rdeoswdmd5485qjr6i486zp X-HE-Tag: 1729545597-237267 X-HE-Meta: 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 Cq9ctEhN 3GJKdTwzbH6YbHzF5y9DnZf7sfFi632+8w7LYQTdq4sLhwb8S2dmizZPYs75jqiiy10WmRyDSwFNjhr7Z5cLCcH/76Uplu2FwsEh535nDA5IYYl8RZFw9DTJzrG6ver6O24aCC1+dAX4go+QnAu0sRvKPpXehmDyhpY+UrRCsJtHW2wPSLudLcjjKfJtDw54rrMxMHS4yK50qOiwBmP1XIyloB6XhMz4Cvm5mqhVzKtmhyXisp+1/Exd03LX3s0zd/tOgKeQQ7ydD+WkzpGFatQ52FYb0Zj7FA9n8mjmiDyRhA7Q+SleFP4VnaAVY9mkzp0RKJv0R6vC0hkf+BXSFeQa7/Th6zzDeDoC6JjDcWX1cKCMSK3lnHfChfKJwhCSrLmiUDCT2IotoocZGw6S5B9REVy6T5U+dzfrF X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: >> Yes, I see from Lorenzo's reply that there is apparently some history to >> this (maybe it's all nicely summarized in the cover letter / this patch, >> have to dig further). >> >> Not sure yet what the problem is, I would have thought it's all protected by >> the PTL, and concurrent faults are user space doing something stupid and >> we'd detect it. > > The looping mechanism is fine for dealing with concurrent faults. There's > no actual _race_ due to PTL, it's just that a user could repeatedly > populate stuff stupidly in a range that is meant to have poison markers put > in. > > It's not likely and would be kind of an abusive of the interface, and it'd > really be a process just hurting itself. > > In nearly all cases you won't zap at all. The whole point is it's > optimistic. In 99.99% of others you zap once... Exactly! And that's why I am questioning whether the kernel should care about that. See below. > >> >> Have to do some more reading on this. > > May I suggest a book on the history of the prodigy? :D > >> >>> >>> I'd normally agree with the KIS principle, but.. >>> >>>> We can always implement support for that later if >>> >>> it would either mean later we change behavior (installing guards on >>> non-zapped PTEs would have to be an error now but maybe start working later, >>> which is user observable change thus can break somebody) >>> >>>> really required (leave behavior open when documenting). >>> >>> and leaving it open when documenting doesn't really mean anything for the >>> "we don't break userspace" promise vs what the implementation actually does. >> >> Not quite I think. You could start return -EEXIST or -EOPNOTSUPP and >> document that this can change in the future to succeed if there is >> something. User space can sense support. > > Yeah I mean originally I had a -EAGAIN which was sort of equivalent of this > but Jann pointed out you're just shifting work to userland who would loop > and repeat. > > I just don't see why we'd do this. > > In fact I was looking at the series and thinking 'wow it's actually a > really small delta' and being proud but... still not KIS enough apparently > ;) You know, I read a lot of kernel code ... and mfill_atomic_install_pte() is what popped in my head: if there is already something, let user space handle it, because it is unexpected. The uffd interface is slightly better, as it gives you the number of processed PTEs back, which madvise() is not designed for. But maybe this (returning how many we already processed) is not required due to the nature of guard pages (below). > >> >> Something failing that at one point starts working is not really breaking >> user space, unless someone really *wants* to fail if there is already >> something (e.g., concurrent fault -> bail out instead of hiding it). >> >> Of course, a more elegant solution would be GUARD_INSTALL vs. >> GUARD_FORCE_INSTALL. >> >> .. but again, there seems to be more history to this. > > I don't think there's really any value in that. There's just no sensible > situation in which a user would care about this I don't think. Making sure nobody touches an area, and wile doing that somebody already touched that area? I guess it could be worked around by mprotect(PROT_NONE),madvise(GUARD),mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE) ... which is not particularly nice :) > > And if you're saying 'hey do MADV_DONTNEED if this fails and keep trying!' > then why not just do that in the kernel? Heh, no! If user space doesn't expect there to be something, it should *fail*. That's likely going to be the majority of use cases for guard pages (happy to be told otherwise). No retry. And if user space expects there to be something it should zap ahead of time (which some allocators maybe already do to free up memory after free()) to then install the guard. No retry. There is this case where user space might be unsure. There, it might make sense to retry exactly once. > > Trying to explain to a user 'hey this is for installing guard pages but if > there's a facing fault it'll fail and that could keep happening and then > you'll have to zap and maybe in a loop' just... seems like a bloody awful > interface? Hope my example above made it clearer. This "retry forever until it works" use case doesn't quite make sense to me, but I might just be missing something important. But again, I have to do more reading on the history of the current approach ... and it's fairly late here. -- Cheers, David / dhildenb