From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com,
baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
npache@redhat.com, ryan.roberts@arm.com, dev.jain@arm.com,
baohua@kernel.org, ackerleytng@google.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, michael.roth@amd.com, vannapurve@google.com
Cc: ziy@nvidia.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: thp: Deny THP for guest_memfd and secretmem in file_thp_enabled()
Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2026 11:24:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0d9cada8-7148-4a5c-a09d-120ef54559d7@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260209033558.22943-1-kartikey406@gmail.com>
On 2/9/26 04:35, Deepanshu Kartikey wrote:
> file_thp_enabled() incorrectly returns true for guest_memfd and secretmem
> inodes because they appear as regular read-only files when
> CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled. This allows khugepaged and
> MADV_COLLAPSE to create large folios in the page cache, but their fault
> handlers do not support large folios.
>
> Add explicit checks for GUEST_MEMFD_MAGIC and SECRETMEM_MAGIC to reject
> these filesystems early in file_thp_enabled().
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33a04338019ac7e43a44
> Tested-by: syzbot+33a04338019ac7e43a44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <Kartikey406@gmail.com>
So we were able to reproduce this with secretmem, right?
We want to add "Fixes:" for the introducing commits, which would be he
commits that enable secretmem and mapping of guest_memfd pages to user
space. Can you identify them?
And also
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> mm/huge_memory.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
> index 40cf59301c21..4f57c78b57dd 100644
> --- a/mm/huge_memory.c
> +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
> @@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static inline bool file_thp_enabled(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> return false;
>
> inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
> + if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == GUEST_MEMFD_MAGIC ||
> + inode->i_sb->s_magic == SECRETMEM_MAGIC)
> + return false;
That's nasty. We want some way to identify that through the mapping.
Unfortunately CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS ignores any
mapping_set_large_folios() configs by design.
And CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS might go away soon, but we need a fix
until then.
While we can identify secretmem through vma_is_secretmem(), we can't do
the same for guest_memfd as it's built as a module.
Unfortunately AS_NO_DIRECT_MAP[1] won't work.
Maybe introduce a AS_NO_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS, which we can just easily
rip out along with CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS later?
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260126164445.11867-6-kalyazin@amazon.com
--
Cheers,
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-09 10:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-09 3:35 Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 10:24 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-02-09 10:41 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 13:06 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-09 18:22 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-09 19:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 20:13 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 21:31 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-10 23:00 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 0:58 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 2:01 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:29 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:16 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:35 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 16:44 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 1:59 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 9:28 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-11 14:50 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-11 15:38 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-11 16:45 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-12 22:19 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-02-13 5:02 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-13 9:06 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-21 4:37 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 1:51 ` Deepanshu Kartikey
2026-02-10 9:33 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-02-09 23:37 ` kernel test robot
2026-02-10 17:51 ` kernel test robot
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