From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Meta kernel team <kernel-team@meta.com>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] memcg: nmi-safe kmem charging
Date: Tue, 13 May 2025 09:15:23 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <07e4e8d9-2588-41bf-89d4-328ca6afd263@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <mzrsx4x5xluljyxy5h5ha6kijcno3ormac3sobc3k7bkj5wepr@cuz2fluc5m5d>
On 5/12/25 21:12, Shakeel Butt wrote:
> I forgot to CC Tejun, so doing it now.
>
> On Mon, May 12, 2025 at 05:56:09PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>> On 5/10/25 01:28, Shakeel Butt wrote:
>> > BPF programs can trigger memcg charged kernel allocations in nmi
>> > context. However memcg charging infra for kernel memory is not equipped
>> > to handle nmi context. This series adds support for kernel memory
>> > charging for nmi context.
>> >
>> > The initial prototype tried to make memcg charging infra for kernel
>> > memory re-entrant against irq and nmi. However upon realizing that
>> > this_cpu_* operations are not safe on all architectures (Tejun), this
>>
>> I assume it was an off-list discussion?
>> Could we avoid this for the architectures where these are safe, which should
>> be the major ones I hope?
>
> Yes it was an off-list discussion. The discussion was more about the
> this_cpu_* ops vs atomic_* ops as on x86 this_cpu_* does not have lock
> prefix and how I should prefer this_cpu_* over atomic_* for my series on
> objcg charging without disabling irqs. Tejun pointed out this_cpu_* are
> not nmi safe for some archs and it would be better to handle nmi context
> separately. So, I am not that worried about optimizing for NMI context
Well, we're introducing in_nmi() check and different execution paths to all
charging. This could be e.g. compiled out for architectures where this_cpu*
is NMI safe or they don't have NMIs in the first place.
> but your next comment on generic_atomic64_* ops is giving me headache.
>
>>
>> > series took a different approach targeting only nmi context. Since the
>> > number of stats that are updated in kernel memory charging path are 3,
>> > this series added special handling of those stats in nmi context rather
>> > than making all >100 memcg stats nmi safe.
>>
>> Hmm so from patches 2 and 3 I see this relies on atomic64_add().
>> But AFAIU lib/atomic64.c has the generic fallback implementation for
>> architectures that don't know better, and that would be using the "void
>> generic_atomic64_##op" macro, which AFAICS is doing:
>>
>> local_irq_save(flags); \
>> arch_spin_lock(lock); \
>> v->counter c_op a; \
>> arch_spin_unlock(lock); \
>> local_irq_restore(flags); \
>>
>> so in case of a nmi hitting after the spin_lock this can still deadlock?
>>
>> Hm or is there some assumption that we only use these paths when already
>> in_nmi() and then another nmi can't come in that context?
>>
>> But even then, flush_nmi_stats() in patch 1 isn't done in_nmi() and uses
>> atomic64_xchg() which in generic_atomic64_xchg() implementation also has the
>> irq_save+spin_lock. So can't we deadlock there?
>
> I was actually assuming that atomic_* ops are safe against nmis for all
> archs. I looked at atomic_* ops in include/asm-generic/atomic.h and it
> is using arch_cmpxchg() for CONFIG_SMP and it seems like for archs with
> cmpxchg should be fine against nmi. I am not sure why atomic64_* are not
> using arch_cmpxchg() instead. I will dig more.
Yeah I've found https://docs.kernel.org/core-api/local_ops.html and since it
listed Mathieu we discussed on IRC and he mentioned the same thing that
atomic_ ops are fine, but the later added 64bit variant isn't, which PeterZ
(who added it) acknowledged.
But there could be way out if we could somehow compile-time assert that
either is true:
- CONFIG_HAVE_NMI=n - we can compile out all the nmi code
- this_cpu is safe on that arch - we can also compile out the nmi code
- (if the above leaves any 64bit arch) its 64bit atomics implementation is safe
- (if there are any 32bit applicable arch left) 32bit atomics should be
enough for the nmi counters even with >4GB memory as we flush them? and we
know the 32bit ops are safe
> I also have the followup series on objcg charging without irq almost
> ready. I will send it out as rfc soon.
>
> Thanks a lot for awesome and insightful comments.
> Shakeel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-13 7:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-09 23:28 Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 1/4] memcg: add infra for nmi safe memcg stats Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 2/4] memcg: add nmi-safe update for MEMCG_KMEM Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 3/4] memcg: nmi-safe slab stats updates Shakeel Butt
2025-05-09 23:28 ` [PATCH 4/4] memcg: make objcg charging nmi safe Shakeel Butt
2025-05-13 22:25 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-05-14 16:46 ` Shakeel Butt
2025-05-10 1:26 ` [PATCH 0/4] memcg: nmi-safe kmem charging Andrew Morton
2025-05-10 3:11 ` Shakeel Butt
2025-05-10 7:00 ` Harry Yoo
2025-05-12 14:52 ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-05-12 15:56 ` Vlastimil Babka
2025-05-12 19:12 ` Shakeel Butt
2025-05-13 7:15 ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2025-05-13 11:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-05-13 22:17 ` Shakeel Butt
2025-05-14 7:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-05-15 1:49 ` Shakeel Butt
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