From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>,
concord@gentoo.org, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>,
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
Peter Gerber <peter@arbitrary.ch>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Revert "slub: force on no_hash_pointers when slub_debug is enabled"
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 09:44:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <046f0c76-f2b1-5df7-7c3e-76c0187da069@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230208194712.never.999-kees@kernel.org>
On 2/8/23 20:47, Kees Cook wrote:
> This reverts commit 792702911f581f7793962fbeb99d5c3a1b28f4c3.
>
> Linking no_hash_pointers() to slub_debug has had a chilling effect
> on using slub_debug features for security hardening, since system
> builders are forced to choose between redzoning and heap address location
> exposures. Instead, just require that the "no_hash_pointers" boot param
> needs to be used to expose pointers during slub_debug reports.
Searching lore made me find [1] and I like the more concrete changelog as
well as updated documentation.
While it's convenient, it's probably indeed not slub's decision to enable
no_hash_pointers. But Stephen also has a point in reply to [1]. If the
data/address leak is indeed a concern, slub_debug will still print raw dumps
as part of the reports, so will e.g. dump_page(), so hashing %p is not a
complete solution and something more generic could be created for
controlling prints that distinguishes hardening vs debugging?
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/all/8e472c9e-2076-bc25-5912-8433adf7b579@arbitrary.ch/
> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
> Cc: concord@gentoo.org
> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202109200726.2EFEDC5@keescook/
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> include/linux/kernel.h | 2 --
> lib/vsprintf.c | 2 +-
> mm/slub.c | 4 ----
> 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
> index fe6efb24d151..e3d9d3879495 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kernel.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
> @@ -229,8 +229,6 @@ int sscanf(const char *, const char *, ...);
> extern __scanf(2, 0)
> int vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list);
>
> -extern int no_hash_pointers_enable(char *str);
> -
> extern int get_option(char **str, int *pint);
> extern char *get_options(const char *str, int nints, int *ints);
> extern unsigned long long memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr);
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index be71a03c936a..410b4a80a58a 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode,
> return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
> }
>
> -int __init no_hash_pointers_enable(char *str)
> +static int __init no_hash_pointers_enable(char *str)
> {
> if (no_hash_pointers)
> return 0;
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 13459c69095a..63f7337dd433 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -5005,10 +5005,6 @@ void __init kmem_cache_init(void)
> if (debug_guardpage_minorder())
> slub_max_order = 0;
>
> - /* Print slub debugging pointers without hashing */
> - if (__slub_debug_enabled())
> - no_hash_pointers_enable(NULL);
> -
> kmem_cache_node = &boot_kmem_cache_node;
> kmem_cache = &boot_kmem_cache;
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-10 8:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-08 19:47 Kees Cook
2023-02-08 23:58 ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2023-02-09 0:35 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-10 8:44 ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=046f0c76-f2b1-5df7-7c3e-76c0187da069@suse.cz \
--to=vbabka@suse.cz \
--cc=42.hyeyoo@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
--cc=bvanassche@acm.org \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=concord@gentoo.org \
--cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
--cc=kbusch@kernel.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mpatocka@redhat.com \
--cc=penberg@kernel.org \
--cc=peter@arbitrary.ch \
--cc=pmladek@suse.com \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=roman.gushchin@linux.dev \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=senozhatsky@chromium.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=swboyd@chromium.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox