From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, simon guinot <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
rkrcmar@redhat.com, matt@codeblueprint.co.uk,
linus walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, paul gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>,
hpa@zytor.com, dan j williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
aarcange@redhat.com, sfr@canb.auug.org.au,
andriy shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
msalter@redhat.com, ross zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>,
bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
thomas lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
toshi kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
mathieu desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
devel@linuxdriverproject.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mchehab@kernel.or
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 14:32:07 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <014b833f-a6e6-fcde-ecc5-2109bf2a0382@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <28535418.4145222.1476735296810.JavaMail.zimbra@redhat.com>
Hi Paolo,
On 10/17/2016 03:14 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> I am not sure if I fully understand this feedback. Let me summaries what
>> we have right now.
>>
>> At highest level SEV key management commands are divided into two sections:
>>
>> - platform management : commands used during platform provisioning. PSP
>> drv provides ioctl's for these commands. Qemu will not use these
>> ioctl's, i believe these ioctl will be used by other tools.
>>
>> - guest management: command used during guest life cycle. PSP drv
>> exports various function and KVM drv calls these function when it
>> receives the SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl from qemu.
>>
>> If I understanding correctly then you are recommending that instead of
>> exporting various functions from PSP drv we should expose one function
>> for the all the guest command handling (something like this).
>
> My understanding is that a user could exhaust the ASIDs for encrypted
> VMs if it was allowed to start an arbitrary number of KVM guests. So
> we would need some kind of control. Is this correct?
>
Yes, there is limited number of ASIDs for encrypted VMs. Do we need to
pass the psp_fd into SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl or can we handle it from Qemu
itself ? e.g when user asks to transition a guest into SEV-enabled mode
then before calling LAUNCH_START Qemu tries to open /dev/psp device. If
open() returns success then we know user has permission to communicate
with PSP firmware. Please let me know if I am missing something.
> If so, does /dev/psp provide any functionality that you believe is
> dangerous for the KVM userspace (which runs in a very confined
> environment)? Is this functionality blocked through capability
> checks?
>
I do not see /dev/psp providing anything which would be dangerous to KVM
userspace. It should be safe to access /dev/psp into KVM userspace.
> Thanks,
>
> Paolo
>
>
>> int psp_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep,
>> int cmd, unsigned long addr,
>> int *psp_ret)
>> {
>> /* here we check to ensure that file->f_ops is a valid
>> * psp instance.
>> */
>> if (filep->f_ops != &psp_fops)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> /* handle the command */
>> return psp_issue_cmd (cmd, addr, timeout, psp_ret);
>> }
>>
>> In KVM driver use something like this to invoke the PSP command handler.
>>
>> int kvm_sev_psp_cmd (struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd *input,
>> unsigned long data)
>> {
>> int ret;
>> struct fd f;
>>
>> f = fdget(input->psp_fd);
>> if (!f.file)
>> return -EBADF;
>> ....
>>
>> psp_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, input->cmd,
>> data, &input->psp_ret);
>> ....
>> }
>>
>> Please let me know if I understood this correctly.
>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 ++++
>>>> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 125
>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-18 19:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23 9:33 ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23 9:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23 7:14 ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2016-10-18 21:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
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