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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
	vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com,
	rientjes@google.com, tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
	jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com,
	zhi.a.wang@intel.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	rppt@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 11/26] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 12:22:39 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <011fed12-7fcd-4df8-b264-b55db2f3e95f@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240116161909.msbdwiyux7wsxw2i@amd.com>

On 1/16/24 08:19, Michael Roth wrote:
> 
> So at the very least, if we went down this path, we would be worth
> investigating the following areas in addition to general perf testing:
> 
>   1) Only splitting directmap regions corresponding to kernel-allocatable
>      *data* (hopefully that's even feasible...)

Take a look at the 64-bit memory map in here:

	https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst

We already have separate mappings for kernel data and (normal) kernel text.

>   2) Potentially deferring the split until an SNP guest is actually
>      run, so there isn't any impact just from having SNP enabled (though
>      you still take a hit from RMP checks in that case so maybe it's not
>      worthwhile, but that itself has been noted as a concern for users
>      so it would be nice to not make things even worse).

Yes, this would be nice too.

>> Actually, where _is_ the TLB flushing here?
> Boris pointed that out in v6, and we implemented it in v7, but it
> completely cratered performance:

That *desperately* needs to be documented.

How can it be safe to skip the TLB flush?  It this akin to a page
permission promotion where you go from RO->RW but can skip the TLB
flush?  In that case, the CPU will see the RO TLB entry violation, drop
it, and re-walk the page tables, discovering the RW entry.

Does something similar happen here where the CPU sees the 2M/4k conflict
in the TLB, drops the 2M entry, does a re-walk then picks up the
newly-split 2M->4k entries?

I can see how something like that would work, but it's _awfully_ subtle
to go unmentioned.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-16 20:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-30 16:19 [PATCH v1 00/26] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-31 11:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-31 16:44     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 02/26] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 03/26] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 10:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 10:58   ` Joerg Roedel
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 04/26] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 11:05   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-05 16:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 16:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-08 16:49         ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-08 17:04           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 11:56             ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-09 12:29               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 12:44                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-14 16:56                   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-04 11:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 14:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 19:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 21:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 05/26] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 06/26] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 07/26] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-10  9:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 20:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-10 22:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 11:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:51         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 08/26] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 09/26] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 10/26] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-12 14:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 11/26] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2024-01-12 19:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:00   ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-12 20:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:27       ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15  9:06         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15  9:14           ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15  9:16           ` Mike Rapoport
2024-01-15  9:20             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-12 20:37         ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-15  9:23           ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-16 16:19           ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 16:50             ` Michael Roth
     [not found]               ` <ZabjKpCqx9np0SEI@kernel.org>
2024-01-26  1:49                 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 18:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 20:22             ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2024-01-26  1:35               ` Michael Roth
2024-01-15  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 16:21       ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-17  9:34         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15  9:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 12/26] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-15  9:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  1:56     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 13/26] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-15 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15 19:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  2:48     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 14/26] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-17  9:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 15/26] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-08 10:45   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-09 22:19     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-10  8:59       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 16/26] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 17/26] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-18 14:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 18/26] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-19 17:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-19 17:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-19 17:48       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:29     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 19/26] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 20/26] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2024-01-10 14:59   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11  0:50     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 21/26] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:03     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-26 13:38     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 22/26] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:44     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 23/26] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 24/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:32     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 25/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 26/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:30     ` Michael Roth

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