From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6225CBFB for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 18:53:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from Galois.linutronix.de (www.linutronix.de [62.245.132.108]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1599E198 for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2015 18:53:08 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 20:52:36 +0200 (CEST) From: Thomas Gleixner To: Kees Cook In-Reply-To: Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Cc: Jiri Kosina , ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Emily Ratliff Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Mon, 24 Aug 2015, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 4:56 AM, James Morris wrote: > This is far from a comprehensive list, though. The biggest value, I > think, would be in using KERNEXEC, UDEREF, USERCOPY, and the plugins > for constification and integer overflow. There is another aspect. We need to make developers more aware of the potential attack issues. I learned my lesson with the futex disaster and since then I certainly look with a different set of eyes at user space facing code. I doubt that we want that everyone experiences the disaster himself (though that's a very enlightening experience), but we should try to document incidents and the lessons learned from them. Right now we just rely on those who are deep into the security realm or the few people who learned it the hard way. Thanks, tglx