From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>,
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>,
users <users@kernel.org>, ksummit <ksummit@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: Re: slowly decommission bugzilla?
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2026 10:23:00 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aaRZ1EIDE-SlqWOo@laps> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260228155611.70911c0f@fedora>
On Sat, Feb 28, 2026 at 03:56:11PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>On Sat, 28 Feb 2026 21:28:57 +0100 (CET)
>Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote:
>
>> Wouldn't that only work if the report is able to upload the kernel debug
>> info too?
>
>Yes, this would be nice if we had the help from the distros that could
>automate this process.
So I've been poking at using LLMs for this.
decode_stacktrace.sh is great when you have a debug build handy, but
asking a random bug reporter to obtain debuginfo, set up the tooling,
and run the script is quite the hurdle.
The debuginfo problem is solvable on the server side though. Given a
kernel version string from the oops, an LLM can figure out which distro
and package version the reporter is running, pull the right debuginfo
(or build from the matching config/tag if no debuginfo package exists),
and run decode_stacktrace.sh itself. In the example below it figured
out this was an Arch chaotic-aur build, found no debuginfo package
available, so it built vmlinux from the v7.0-rc1 tag with the Arch
PKGBUILD config and verified the disassembly matched the crash dump
byte-for-byte. That's the kind of thing no reporter is ever going to
do, but a bot can do it routinely.
As an example, this bug report came in today with no replies:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/DGRCO9SL0T5U.JTINSHJQ9KPK@imlonghao.com/
I fed it to an LLM. It decoded the stack trace (as described above),
then traced the crash to iptfs_reassem_cont() at xfrm_iptfs.c:905:
skb_put() on a non-linear skb. It identified the offending commit
(5f2b6a9095743), the code author (Christian Hopps), the relevant
maintainers, and a couple more vulnerable call sites in the same
function. Not perfect, but enough to get the report to the right people
with useful context already attached.
What I'd like to propose: set up something like bug@kernel.org with a
bot that watches it. When a report comes in, it:
1. Pulls the oops/stack trace from the email (if exists)
2. Figures out the kernel version, obtains or builds debuginfo, and
decodes the stack trace
3. Reads the relevant source, identifies root cause, offending commit,
and the right maintainers/lists
4. Forwards the report with its analysis to the right list, Cc'ing
the right people
One email address, no tooling required from the reporter, bugs get to
the right list with a decoded stack trace and first-pass analysis. The
analysis will be wrong sometimes, but even just the decoded trace and
correct routing is better than what bugzilla gives us today.
For reference, below is the full output of the LLM analysis of the bug
report linked above. This is what the bot would attach when forwarding
a report to maintainers:
==============================================================================
1. Bug Summary
==============================================================================
A kernel panic occurs in the XFRM IP-TFS (IP Traffic Flow Security, RFC 9347)
reassembly path when receiving inner packets that span three or more IPTFS
tunnel packets. The crash is a BUG() in skb_put() (net/core/skbuff.c:2651),
triggered by the SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT() macro, which fires because skb_put() is
called on a socket buffer that has already been made non-linear by a prior
fragment-sharing operation. The panic is trivially reproducible: establish an
IPsec tunnel with IPTFS AGGFRAG mode using strongSwan, then send a ping with
payload larger than the tunnel MTU ("ping -s 3333"). The receiving end panics
in interrupt context.
Kernel versions : 7.0.0-rc1-1-mainline, 6.18.13-arch1-1, NixOS 6.18.13
Distributions : Arch Linux, NixOS
Architecture : x86_64 (SMP, PREEMPT full)
Subsystem : XFRM / IPsec / IP-TFS (net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c)
Module : xfrm_iptfs
Severity : Critical -- kernel panic in IRQ context, immediate crash
Reporter : Hao Long <me@imlonghao.com>
Date : 2026-03-01
==============================================================================
2. Code Analysis
==============================================================================
--- Files and functions involved ---
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:905 iptfs_reassem_cont() -- FAULTING CALLER
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1266 iptfs_input_ordered()
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1725 iptfs_input()
net/core/skbuff.c:2651 skb_put() -- BUG site
include/linux/skbuff.h:2699 SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT() -- the assertion macro
The crash site is net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c line 905 in iptfs_reassem_cont():
/* Try share then copy. */
if (fragwalk &&
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags(newskb, fragwalk, data, copylen)) {
iptfs_skb_add_frags(newskb, fragwalk, data, copylen); /* line 902 */
} else {
/* copy fragment data into newskb */
if (skb_copy_seq_read(st, data, skb_put(newskb, copylen), /* line 905 -- BUG */
copylen)) {
skb_put() (net/core/skbuff.c:2648-2657) contains:
void *skb_put(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
{
void *tmp = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT(skb); /* line 2651 -- BUG_ON(skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) */
skb->tail += len;
...
}
SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT expands to BUG_ON(skb->data_len != 0). A non-linear skb
(one with data in page fragments or a frag_list, indicated by data_len > 0)
cannot be extended with skb_put() -- only the linear head area is addressable
via skb_put().
There are two additional skb_put() calls on newskb in the same function that
are vulnerable to the same issue:
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:845 memcpy(skb_put(newskb, runtlen), ...)
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:870 skb_copy_seq_read(st, data, skb_put(newskb, copylen), ...)
Line 845 is unlikely to trigger because it operates on a freshly allocated
newskb. Line 870 (IP header completion path) could trigger under the same
conditions as line 905 if the IP header is not yet complete when a non-linear
newskb is being continued.
--- Recent commits touching the relevant code ---
5f2b6a9095743 xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code <-- INTRODUCED THE BUG
3f3339885fb34 xfrm: iptfs: add reusing received skb for the tunnel egress packet
0756947654468 xfrm: iptfs: handle received fragmented inner packets
6c82d24336718 xfrm: iptfs: add basic receive packet (tunnel egress) handling
8579d342ea2b3 xfrm: iptfs: add fragmenting of larger than MTU user packets
b96ba312e21c9 xfrm: iptfs: share page fragments of inner packets
0e4fbf013fa56 xfrm: iptfs: add user packet (tunnel ingress) handling
4b3faf610cc63 xfrm: iptfs: add new iptfs xfrm mode impl
ed58b186c7737 xfrm: iptfs: add tracepoint functionality
6be02e3e4f376 xfrm: iptfs: handle reordering of received packets
Author of the faulting code (git blame on lines 895-910):
5f2b6a9095743a (Christian Hopps 2024-11-14 02:07:10 -0500) -- all lines
The entire fragment-sharing block (lines 891-911) was added in commit
5f2b6a9095743 by Christian Hopps as part of the 17-patch IPTFS series merged
via Steffen Klassert's ipsec-next tree for 6.14-rc1.
--- Root cause hypothesis ---
The bug is a logic error in multi-packet reassembly with fragment sharing:
1. A large inner IP packet (e.g., 3333-byte ICMP echo) arrives at the IPTFS
tunnel endpoint fragmented across multiple IPTFS tunnel packets.
2. For the first continuation packet, iptfs_reassem_cont() is called. The
conditions at lines 892-894 are satisfied:
if (!skb_has_frag_list(skb) && !skb_has_frag_list(newskb) &&
(skb->head_frag || skb->len == skb->data_len) &&
skb->pp_recycle == newskb->pp_recycle)
and iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() returns true, so iptfs_skb_add_frags()
(line 902) shares page fragments from the incoming skb into newskb. This
makes newskb NON-LINEAR: newskb->data_len > 0, newskb->nr_frags > 0.
3. newskb is saved in xtfs->ra_newskb and the function returns, awaiting the
next continuation packet.
4. When the second (or subsequent) continuation packet arrives,
iptfs_reassem_cont() is called again with the same (now non-linear) newskb.
This time, one of the fragment-sharing preconditions fails -- for example:
- The new incoming skb may not have head_frag set AND skb->len != skb->data_len
- iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() returns false (e.g., MAX_SKB_FRAGS reached)
- The pp_recycle flags don't match
5. Execution falls to the else branch (line 903), which calls:
skb_put(newskb, copylen)
But newskb is non-linear from step 2. SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT fires. Kernel panic.
Register state from the crash confirms this analysis:
RSI = 0x30 (copylen = 48 bytes being appended)
RAX = 0x56e (current skb->len = 1390, including fragment data)
--- Affects mainline, stable, or distro-specific? ---
This affects MAINLINE and all kernels containing commit 5f2b6a9095743, which
was merged for the 6.14-rc1 merge window. It is not distro-specific -- it was
reproduced on Arch Linux and NixOS with three different kernel versions
(6.18.13 and 7.0.0-rc1).
==============================================================================
3. Prior Reports
==============================================================================
--- Identical report (this bug) ---
Subject: [BUG] Kernel Panic in iptfs_reassem_cont when handling large packets
Author: Hao Long <me@imlonghao.com>
Date: 2026-03-01
URL: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/DGRCO9SL0T5U.JTINSHJQ9KPK@imlonghao.com/
Status: NO REPLIES as of analysis time
--- Related patch (different bug, same file, same day) ---
Subject: [PATCH] xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload
Author: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
Date: 2026-03-01
URL: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260301105638.11479-1-roshaen09@gmail.com/
Fixes: 6c82d2433671 ("xfrm: iptfs: add basic receive packet (tunnel egress) handling")
Note: Fixes a different bug -- infinite loop with tot_len=0 inner IPv4
header. Does NOT fix the skb_put crash.
--- Original patch series that introduced the code ---
Subject: [PATCH ipsec-next 00/17] Add IP-TFS mode to xfrm
Author: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Date: 2025-01-09
URL: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250109094321.2268124-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com/
No existing fix patch for this specific crash was found. This is a NEW,
UNRESOLVED bug. It is not a known regression from a specific commit (it has
existed since the fragment-sharing code was first merged).
==============================================================================
4. Decoded Stack Trace
==============================================================================
Debug symbols: Built vmlinux and xfrm_iptfs.ko from v7.0-rc1 tag using the
Arch Linux PKGBUILD config (CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y, CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF5=y).
Verified by disassembly that the compiled code is BYTE-IDENTICAL to the
chaotic-aur prebuilt linux-mainline-7.0rc1-1 package: the entire
iptfs_reassem_cont function (365 instructions) and skb_put function produce
zero diff between local, chaotic-aur, and crash-dump code bytes. The 1-byte
difference in the return-thunk jmp target (0xe9 0xc4 vs 0xe9 0xd4) is KASLR
runtime patching. Relocation records confirm +0x128 is call skb_put, +0x144
is call skb_copy_seq_read.
Note: Actual debug packages are not available for this kernel. The AUR
PKGBUILD has "!debug" and explicitly strips vmlinux. No debuginfod server
(Arch, elfutils, Fedora, Ubuntu) indexes build ID
b84afef9bed61122840347d0d1295877239d5881.
Full decoded output from scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
[ 412.126912] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 412.126945] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2651!
[ 412.126974] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 412.127009] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-1-mainline #1 PREEMPT(full)
[ 412.127061] Hardware name: Vultr VC2, BIOS
[ 412.127076] RIP: 0010:skb_put (net/core/skbuff.c:2651 (discriminator 3)) <<<< BUG: SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT
All code
========
0: bc 00 00 00 01 mov $0x1000000,%esp
5: 77 70 ja 0x77
7: 48 89 c2 mov %rax,%rdx
a: 48 03 87 c8 00 00 00 add 0xc8(%rdi),%rax
11: 01 f2 add %esi,%edx
13: 89 97 bc 00 00 00 mov %edx,0xbc(%rdi)
19: 39 97 c0 00 00 00 cmp %edx,0xc0(%rdi)
1f: 0f 82 c0 c2 14 ff jb 0xffffffffff14c2e5
25: e9 c4 a0 2f 00 jmp 0x2fa0ee
2a:* 0f 0b ud2 <-- trapping instruction (BUG())
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
0: 0f 0b ud2
[ 412.127288] Call Trace:
[ 412.127298] <IRQ>
[ 412.127308] iptfs_reassem_cont (net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:905 (discriminator 1)) xfrm_iptfs <<<< FAULTING CALLER
[ 412.127335] iptfs_input_ordered (net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1266) xfrm_iptfs
[ 412.127356] iptfs_input (net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1725 (discriminator 4)) xfrm_iptfs
[ 412.127373] ? esp_input+0x1f7/0x330 [esp4]
[ 412.127399] xfrm_input (net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:695)
[ 412.127449] xfrm4_esp_rcv (net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104 (discriminator 1))
[ 412.127473] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207 (discriminator 7))
[ 412.127497] ip_local_deliver_finish (include/linux/rcupdate.h:883 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:242)
[ 412.127509] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:2507 net/core/dev.c:6109)
[ 412.127529] ? kmalloc_reserve (net/core/skbuff.c:616 (discriminator 107))
[ 412.127540] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:714 (discriminator 1))
[ 412.127551] ? napi_alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:853)
[ 412.127568] ? page_to_skb+0x2a9/0x400 [virtio_net]
[ 412.127610] __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:6232)
[ 412.127628] netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:6300 net/core/dev.c:6389)
[ 412.127645] napi_complete_done (include/linux/list.h:45 include/net/gro.h:524 net/core/dev.c:6757)
[ 412.127660] ? virtnet_rq_get_buf+0x2d/0x60 [virtio_net]
[ 412.127684] virtnet_poll+0x6de/0xdbd [virtio_net]
[ 412.127710] __napi_poll (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:37 include/trace/events/napi.h:14 net/core/dev.c:7685)
[ 412.127723] ? skb_defer_free_flush (net/core/dev.c:6802 (discriminator 3))
[ 412.127745] net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7747 net/core/dev.c:7899)
[ 412.127761] handle_softirqs (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:37 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:623)
[ 412.127802] __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:657 kernel/softirq.c:496 kernel/softirq.c:723)
[ 412.127817] common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:326 (discriminator 49))
[ 412.127848] </IRQ>
[ 412.127858] <TASK>
[ 412.127867] asm_common_interrupt (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:688)
[ 412.127904] RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt (arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c:63)
[ 412.127926] default_idle
[ 412.127926] default_idle_call
[ 412.127926] do_idle
[ 412.127926] cpu_startup_entry
[ 412.127926] start_secondary
[ 412.127926] common_startup_64
[ 412.127926] </TASK>
--- Most relevant frames ---
#0 skb_put() net/core/skbuff.c:2651
BUG_ON(skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) fires -- skb->data_len != 0 because page
fragments were previously added by iptfs_skb_add_frags().
#1 iptfs_reassem_cont() net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:905 <<<< ROOT CAUSE
The call: skb_put(newskb, copylen)
This is the else-branch fallback copy path after the fragment-sharing
check at lines 900-901 fails. newskb was made non-linear by a prior
invocation that took the fragment-sharing path at line 902.
#2 iptfs_input_ordered() net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1266
Calls iptfs_reassem_cont() to continue reassembly of a fragmented
inner packet using the next IPTFS tunnel packet in sequence.
#3 iptfs_input() net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1725
Entry point for IPTFS tunnel packet processing (xfrm input callback).
--- Inline expansions / compiler artifacts ---
- "discriminator 1" at xfrm_iptfs.c:905 indicates this is a specific
branch path within the source line (the else branch).
- "discriminator 3" at skbuff.c:2651 indicates the BUG_ON expansion
within skb_put().
- ip_local_deliver_finish shows inlining from include/linux/rcupdate.h:883
(rcu_read_lock/unlock wrappers).
- napi_complete_done shows inlining from include/net/gro.h:524
(GRO list flush helpers).
==============================================================================
5. Contacts
==============================================================================
--- Maintainers (from scripts/get_maintainer.pl -f net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c) ---
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> (maintainer: NETWORKING [IPSEC])
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> (maintainer: NETWORKING [IPSEC])
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> (maintainer: NETWORKING [IPSEC])
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> (maintainer: NETWORKING [GENERAL])
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (maintainer: NETWORKING [GENERAL])
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> (maintainer: NETWORKING [GENERAL])
--- Reviewer ---
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> (reviewer: NETWORKING [GENERAL])
--- Code author (wrote the faulting code) ---
Christian Hopps <chopps@labn.net>
Author of commit 5f2b6a9095743 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")
Author of the entire xfrm_iptfs.c file (all commits 4b3faf610cc63 through
ed58b186c7737, November 2024).
--- Git signers / recent contributors ---
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> (commit_signer: 50%, recent treewide changes)
Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> (commit_signer: 50%)
--- Mailing lists ---
netdev@vger.kernel.org (primary -- NETWORKING [IPSEC])
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
==============================================================================
6. Recommended Next Steps
==============================================================================
--- Does a fix already exist? ---
No. No fix patch exists on lore.kernel.org or in mainline as of 2026-03-01.
This is a new, unresolved bug.
--- Is more information needed from the reporter? ---
No. The bug report is complete: it includes kernel version, reproduction steps,
full stack trace, and confirmation across three kernel/distro combinations. The
root cause is clear from code analysis.
--- Suggested patch direction ---
The fix must ensure that skb_put() is never called on a non-linear newskb in
iptfs_reassem_cont(). The most straightforward approach:
Option A (simplest): In the else branch at line 903, before calling
skb_put(), linearize newskb if it is non-linear:
} else {
if (skb_is_nonlinear(newskb) &&
__skb_linearize(newskb))
goto abandon;
if (skb_copy_seq_read(st, data, skb_put(newskb, copylen), ...))
This preserves correctness at the cost of a copy when the fallback path is
taken after prior fragment sharing. The same fix should be applied to the
skb_put() at line 870 (IP header completion path).
Option B (more targeted): Always add remaining data as fragments instead of
falling back to skb_put(). When the fragwalk path fails, allocate new page
fragments and add them to the skb rather than trying to copy into the linear
head. This avoids the linearization cost but is more complex.
Option C (conservative): Disable fragment sharing when reassembly will span
more than two tunnel packets, ensuring newskb stays linear throughout
reassembly. Simplest to reason about but gives up the optimization for
large packets.
The Fixes tag should be:
Fixes: 5f2b6a9095743 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")
Reported-by: Hao Long <me@imlonghao.com>
--- Which tree should the fix target? ---
- Mainline (net tree, via Steffen Klassert / ipsec)
- Then backport to stable (affects all kernels >= 6.14 that contain
commit 5f2b6a9095743)
--
Thanks,
Sasha
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-01 15:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-10 4:48 kernel.org tooling update Konstantin Ryabitsev
2025-12-10 8:11 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2025-12-10 13:30 ` Thorsten Leemhuis
2025-12-11 3:04 ` Theodore Tso
2025-12-12 23:48 ` Stephen Hemminger
2025-12-12 23:54 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-12-16 16:21 ` Lukas Wunner
2025-12-16 20:33 ` Jeff Johnson
2025-12-17 0:47 ` Mario Limonciello
2025-12-18 13:37 ` Jani Nikula
2025-12-18 14:09 ` Mario Limonciello
2026-01-23 9:19 ` Web of Trust work [Was: kernel.org tooling update] Uwe Kleine-König
2026-01-23 9:29 ` Greg KH
2026-01-23 11:47 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2026-01-23 11:58 ` Greg KH
2026-01-23 12:24 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2026-01-23 12:29 ` Greg KH
2026-01-23 13:57 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-01-23 16:24 ` James Bottomley
2026-01-23 16:33 ` Greg KH
2026-01-23 16:42 ` Joe Perches
2026-01-23 17:00 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-01-23 17:23 ` James Bottomley
2026-01-23 18:23 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-01-23 21:12 ` Uwe Kleine-König
2026-01-26 16:23 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-01-26 17:32 ` Uwe Kleine-König
2026-01-26 21:01 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-01-26 23:23 ` James Bottomley
2026-01-27 8:39 ` Uwe Kleine-König
2026-01-27 21:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-04 10:49 ` Uwe Kleine-König
2026-02-05 10:14 ` James Bottomley
2026-02-05 18:07 ` Uwe Kleine-König
2026-02-05 18:23 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-01-26 23:33 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2026-01-26 23:06 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2026-01-23 21:38 ` James Bottomley
2026-01-23 22:55 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2026-01-23 16:38 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-01-23 17:02 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-08 7:21 ` Uwe Kleine-König
2026-03-08 10:24 ` Greg KH
2026-03-18 14:02 ` Greg KH
2026-01-23 18:42 ` kernel.org tooling update Randy Dunlap
2026-02-26 8:44 ` slowly decommission bugzilla? (was: Re: kernel.org tooling update) Thorsten Leemhuis
2026-02-26 14:40 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2026-02-26 17:04 ` Andrew Morton
2026-02-27 11:07 ` Jani Nikula
2026-02-27 15:16 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-02-27 15:18 ` Mark Brown
2026-02-27 15:44 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-02-27 15:18 ` slowly decommission bugzilla? Sven Peter
2026-02-27 15:35 ` slowly decommission bugzilla? (was: Re: kernel.org tooling update) Richard Weinberger
2026-02-27 16:00 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2026-02-27 16:22 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-02-27 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-02-27 17:07 ` James Bottomley
2026-02-28 13:41 ` slowly decommission bugzilla? Thorsten Leemhuis
2026-02-28 15:17 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-02-28 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-02-28 18:29 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-02-28 20:26 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-02-28 20:28 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-02-28 20:56 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-03-01 15:23 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2026-03-01 15:35 ` Laurent Pinchart
2026-03-01 15:42 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-01 16:13 ` Laurent Pinchart
2026-03-01 16:27 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-06 15:01 ` Laurent Pinchart
2026-03-07 16:19 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-01 16:15 ` James Bottomley
2026-03-01 16:49 ` Laurent Pinchart
2026-03-02 8:55 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2026-03-01 17:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-03-02 20:28 ` [RFC] kallsyms: embed source file:line info in kernel stack traces Sasha Levin
2026-03-03 5:39 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2026-03-03 12:44 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-03 13:17 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-03-03 16:35 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-06 15:22 ` Laurent Pinchart
2026-03-03 19:09 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2026-03-03 6:26 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-03-03 6:48 ` Tomasz Figa
2026-03-03 9:04 ` Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-03-03 12:45 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-03 8:11 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2026-03-03 9:31 ` Jiri Slaby
2026-03-03 12:47 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-03 12:58 ` James Bottomley
2026-03-03 13:08 ` Jürgen Groß
2026-03-03 8:09 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2026-03-03 22:44 ` Helge Deller
2026-03-03 22:47 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-01 16:01 ` slowly decommission bugzilla? James Bottomley
2026-03-01 16:16 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-01 16:25 ` James Bottomley
2026-03-01 16:33 ` Sasha Levin
2026-03-06 10:37 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-03-06 10:44 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2026-03-15 14:58 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-03-16 11:28 ` Greg KH
2026-03-16 21:56 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-03-17 7:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-04-02 4:59 ` slowly decommission bugzilla? (was: Re: kernel.org tooling update) Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-04-02 13:07 ` Theodore Tso
2026-04-02 13:28 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-04-02 14:08 ` Theodore Tso
2026-04-02 14:21 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-04-02 14:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-04-02 13:51 ` James Bottomley
2026-04-02 13:42 ` slowly decommission bugzilla? Thorsten Leemhuis
2026-04-02 14:04 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2026-04-02 14:15 ` Richard Weinberger
2026-04-02 15:45 ` Laurent Pinchart
2026-04-02 16:04 ` Thorsten Leemhuis
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