From: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
To: "Piotr Masłowski" <piotr@maslowski.xyz>
Cc: Martin Uecker <uecker@tugraz.at>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
rust-for-linux <rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ksummit@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: Rust kernel policy
Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2025 15:31:51 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <E0BD1BDB-0EBC-4E27-9324-7CA70ACE194B@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D7ZDF8NZGPS3.3QBMAVC1NTUDM@maslowski.xyz>
> On Feb 22, 2025, at 3:42 PM, Piotr Masłowski <piotr@maslowski.xyz> wrote:
>
> I'm sure you already know this, but the idea of safety in Rust isn't
> just about making elementary language constructs safe. Rather, it is
> primarily about designing types and code in such a way one can't "use
> them wrong”.
And importantly, it’s very hard to replicate this approach in C, even in a hypothetical ‘C + borrow checker’, because C has no generic types. Not all abstractions need generics, but many do.
Rust has Option<T>. C has null, and you manually track which pointers can be null.
Rust has Result<T, E>. Kernel C has ERR_PTR, and you manually track which pointers can be errors.
Rust has Arc<T> and Box<T> and &T and &mut T to represent different kinds of ownership. C has two pointer types, T * and const T *, and you manually track ownership.
Rust has Vec<T> and &[T] to represent arrays with dynamic length. C has pointers, and you manually keep the pointer and length together.
Rust has Mutex<T> (a mutex along with a mutex-protected value of type T), and MutexGuard<T> (an object representing the fact that a mutex is currently locked). C has plain mutexes, and you manually track which mutexes protect what data, along with which mutexes are currently locked.
Each of these abstractions is simple enough that it *could* be bolted onto C as its own special case. Clang has tried for many. In place of Option<T>, Clang added _Nullable and _Nonnull annotations to pointer types. In place of Arc<T>/Box<T>, Clang added ownership attributes [1]. In place of &[T], Clang added __counted_by / bounds-safety mode [2]. In place of Mutex<T>, Clang added a whole host of mutex-tracking attributes [3].
But needing a separate (and nonstandard) compiler feature for every abstraction you want to make really cuts down on flexibility. Compare Rust for Linux, which not only uses all of that basic vocabulary (with the ability to make Linux-specific customizations as needed), but also defines dozens of custom generic types [4] as safe wrappers around specific Linux APIs, forming abstractions that are too codebase-specific to bake into a compiler at all.
This creates an expressiveness gap between C and Rust that cannot be bridged by safety attributes. Less expressiveness means more need for runtime enforcement, which means more overhead. That is one of the fundamental problems that will face any attempt to implement ‘safe C’.
(A good comparison is Clang’s upcoming bounds-safety feature. It’s the most impressive iteration of ’safe C’ I’ve seen so far. But unlike Rust, it only protects against indexing out of bounds, not against use-after-frees or bad casts. A C extension protecting against those would have to be a lot more invasive. In particular, focusing on spatial safety dodges many of the cases where generics are most important in Rust. But even then, bounds-safety mode requires lots of annotations in order to bring overhead down to acceptable levels.)
[1] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AttributeReference.html#ownership-holds-ownership-returns-ownership-takes-clang-static-analyzer
[2] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/BoundsSafety.html
[3] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ThreadSafetyAnalysis.html
[4] https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Atorvalds%2Flinux+%2F%28%3F-i%29struct+%5B%5E+%5C%28%5D*%3C.*%5BA-Z%5D.*%3E%2F+language%3ARust&type=code (requires GitHub login, sorry)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-23 23:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 186+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CANiq72m-R0tOakf=j7BZ78jDHdy=9-fvZbAT8j91Je2Bxy0sFg@mail.gmail.com>
2025-02-18 16:08 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-02-18 16:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-18 16:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-18 18:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-18 21:22 ` Boqun Feng
2025-02-19 6:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-19 6:35 ` Dave Airlie
2025-02-19 11:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-19 13:25 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2025-02-19 13:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-19 7:05 ` Boqun Feng
2025-02-19 11:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-18 17:36 ` Jiri Kosina
2025-02-20 6:33 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-02-20 18:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-02-18 18:46 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-18 21:49 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-18 22:38 ` Dave Airlie
2025-02-18 22:54 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-19 0:58 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-19 3:04 ` Boqun Feng
2025-02-19 5:07 ` NeilBrown
2025-02-19 5:39 ` Greg KH
2025-02-19 15:05 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-20 20:49 ` Lyude Paul
2025-02-21 19:24 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-20 7:03 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-20 7:10 ` Greg KH
2025-02-20 8:57 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-20 13:46 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-02-20 14:09 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-20 14:38 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-20 15:25 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-02-20 15:49 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-22 15:30 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-02-20 14:53 ` Greg KH
2025-02-20 15:40 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-21 0:46 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-21 9:48 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-02-21 16:28 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-21 17:43 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-21 18:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-21 18:19 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-21 18:31 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-21 19:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-21 19:59 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-21 20:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-22 7:20 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-21 22:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-21 23:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-22 17:53 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-02-22 18:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-23 16:42 ` David Laight
2025-02-21 23:37 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-25 22:49 ` David Laight
2025-02-22 18:42 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-22 9:45 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-02-22 10:25 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-22 11:07 ` Greg KH
2025-02-21 18:23 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-21 22:14 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-03-01 13:22 ` Askar Safin
2025-03-01 13:55 ` Martin Uecker
2025-03-02 6:50 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-21 18:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-02-24 8:12 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-02-20 22:08 ` Paul E. McKenney
2025-02-22 23:42 ` Piotr Masłowski
2025-02-23 8:10 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-23 23:31 ` comex [this message]
2025-02-24 9:08 ` Ventura Jack
2025-02-24 18:03 ` Martin Uecker
2025-02-20 12:28 ` Jan Engelhardt
2025-02-20 12:37 ` Greg KH
2025-02-20 13:23 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-20 13:51 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-20 15:17 ` C aggregate passing (Rust kernel policy) Jan Engelhardt
2025-02-20 16:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-20 20:34 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-21 8:31 ` HUANG Zhaobin
2025-02-21 18:34 ` David Laight
2025-02-21 19:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-21 20:07 ` comex
2025-02-21 21:45 ` David Laight
2025-02-22 6:32 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-22 6:37 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-22 8:41 ` David Laight
2025-02-22 9:11 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-21 20:06 ` Jan Engelhardt
2025-02-21 20:23 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-21 20:24 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-21 22:02 ` David Laight
2025-02-21 22:13 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-02-22 5:56 ` comex
2025-02-21 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-21 22:19 ` henrychurchill
2025-02-21 22:52 ` henrychurchill
2025-02-20 22:13 ` Rust kernel policy Paul E. McKenney
2025-02-21 5:19 ` Felipe Contreras
2025-02-21 5:36 ` Boqun Feng
2025-02-21 5:59 ` Felipe Contreras
2025-02-21 7:04 ` Dave Airlie
2025-02-24 20:27 ` Felipe Contreras
2025-02-24 20:37 ` Boqun Feng
2025-02-26 2:42 ` Felipe Contreras
2025-02-22 16:04 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-02-22 17:10 ` Ventura Jack
2025-02-22 17:34 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-02-23 2:08 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-02-19 5:53 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2025-02-19 5:59 ` Dave Airlie
2025-02-22 18:46 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-02-19 12:37 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-20 11:26 ` Askar Safin
2025-02-20 12:33 ` vpotach
2025-02-19 18:52 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 19:08 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-19 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-19 20:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-02-19 20:46 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-19 20:52 ` Bart Van Assche
2025-02-19 21:07 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-20 16:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-02-20 8:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-20 8:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-20 11:57 ` Fiona Behrens
2025-02-20 14:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-21 10:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-22 12:10 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-03-04 11:17 ` Fiona Behrens
2025-03-04 17:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-20 9:55 ` Leon Romanovsky
2025-02-19 19:33 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-20 6:32 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2025-02-20 6:53 ` Greg KH
2025-02-20 8:44 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2025-02-20 13:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-20 16:04 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-02-20 12:01 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-20 12:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-02-20 23:42 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-22 15:21 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-02-20 6:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-02-20 23:44 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-21 15:24 ` Simona Vetter
2025-02-22 12:10 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-26 13:17 ` Fiona Behrens
2025-02-21 0:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-21 12:16 ` Danilo Krummrich
2025-02-21 15:59 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-23 18:03 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-23 18:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-26 16:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-02-26 19:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-02-19 8:05 ` Dan Carpenter
2025-02-19 14:14 ` James Bottomley
2025-02-19 14:30 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2025-02-19 14:46 ` Martin K. Petersen
2025-02-19 14:51 ` Bartosz Golaszewski
2025-02-19 15:15 ` James Bottomley
2025-02-19 15:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-19 15:45 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-19 15:46 ` James Bottomley
2025-02-19 15:56 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-19 16:07 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-19 16:15 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-19 16:32 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-02-19 16:34 ` Willy Tarreau
2025-02-19 16:33 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-19 16:47 ` Andrew Lunn
2025-02-19 18:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-20 6:26 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2025-02-20 15:37 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-19 17:00 ` Martin K. Petersen
2025-02-19 15:13 ` Steven Rostedt
2025-02-19 14:05 ` James Bottomley
2025-02-19 15:08 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-19 16:03 ` James Bottomley
2025-02-19 16:44 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-19 17:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-02-20 23:40 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-22 15:03 ` Kent Overstreet
2025-02-20 16:03 ` James Bottomley
2025-02-20 23:47 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-02-20 6:48 ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-02-20 12:56 ` James Bottomley
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