From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1072ED95 for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2015 21:10:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-yk0-f175.google.com (mail-yk0-f175.google.com [209.85.160.175]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D2C5310D for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2015 21:10:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ykll84 with SMTP id l84so200165314ykl.0 for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2015 14:10:49 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 14:10:49 -0700 Message-ID: From: Matthew Garrett To: Kees Cook Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Cc: ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Jiri Kosina , Emily Ratliff Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , (Resending now this address is subscribed) On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 1:51 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > I think another valuable developer to invite would be Matthew Garrett. > He's been looking at hardening the line between root and kernel for a > while now. Yeah, we can't rely on userspace to avoid or mitigate all privilege escalation bugs - avoiding userspace escalation inherently turning into owning the kernel remains valuable. There's various approaches to validating userspace state that are only achievable if the kernel is still trustworthy, so the assumption that root = game over is one that we shouldn't allow the kernel to embody.