From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>,
"ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
<ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
Mark Brown <broonie@sirena.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TOPIC] Secure/verified boot and roots of trust
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2016 10:26:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPeXnHsB6rfROg4j7dv1a0UkhNNFjmqEwJma-wiEcYrwDD5R2w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrU3E48++g2G-o4YDoazphkcVoK-gVLVHna9ZQoKVgnL5g@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 10:23 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 10:17 AM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> wrote:
>> Keys could be stored in a separate section and ignored for the
>> purposes of build comparison.
>
> But that defeats the purpose. If I'm verifying a reproducible build,
> I don't want to have to take it on faith that the packager didn't keep
> a copy of the build-time key.
If you're trusting your upstream's signed bootloader you're already
forced to trust your packagers. If you want to establish your own root
of trust you could simply strip that section, replace it with your own
and re-sign the modules and kernel. Or just keep using signatures,
sign the public module signing key with the kernel signing key and
push the policy decision out to the bootloader.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-03 17:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-03 2:58 Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 3:24 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-03 3:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03 4:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 4:42 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-08-03 4:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 5:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03 8:33 ` Alexandre Belloni
2016-08-03 10:31 ` Mark Brown
2016-08-03 10:43 ` David Howells
2016-08-03 16:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 17:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03 17:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 17:26 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2016-08-03 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 18:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-08-03 23:01 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-08-03 23:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-04 5:26 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-17 11:38 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-08-17 13:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-08-17 16:11 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-08-18 12:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-08-03 12:42 ` James Bottomley
2016-08-03 17:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 17:23 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03 17:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 22:09 ` James Bottomley
[not found] ` <CALCETrVpCnfOJ2aXkNsOXatQAF6NG-AcJpxeYfA9wG_t2ocykg@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CALCETrWgS0XObzxfQWQbyntVEn6QF81K2TVbS4bGNyN6EcYb_A@mail.gmail.com>
2016-08-03 22:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
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