From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D43B68A5 for ; Wed, 12 Aug 2015 22:47:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-ob0-f179.google.com (mail-ob0-f179.google.com [209.85.214.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5912324B for ; Wed, 12 Aug 2015 22:47:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: by obbfr1 with SMTP id fr1so24327438obb.1 for ; Wed, 12 Aug 2015 15:47:51 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <13252.1439419503@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <20436.1438090619@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1438096213.5441.147.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438097471.5441.152.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438099839.5441.165.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438100102.26913.183.camel@infradead.org> <30361.1438101879@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1438111168.26913.189.camel@infradead.org> <1438121016.5441.233.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <16035.1439324695@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <11239.1439403720@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1439405139.3100.147.camel@infradead.org> <13252.1439419503@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2015 15:47:31 -0700 Message-ID: To: David Howells Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: James Bottomley , Luis Rodriguez , "ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org" , Kyle McMartin Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Firmware signing List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 3:45 PM, David Howells wrote: > David Woodhouse wrote: > >> No. Just use a *hash* of the acceptable signing cert(s)=C2=B9. Note that= the >> SKID is *usually* a hash of the public key, but isn't guaranteed to be >> so, so using the SKID to specify the acceptable signing cert isn't >> secure. > > True. That's one of the reasons I don't like SKIDs - the specification i= s > very vague and non-enforcing. We would need a 'standard' for how to hash= the > public key data. Some types of public key, for example, have more than o= ne > integer. I wonder if we could just take the PGP method as the standard - > though that does require extra elements. This is a major benefit of modern (or modernish) ECC schemes: the public key is pretty much unambiguously represented as a byte string. (IIRC P-256 has some variable length garbage for part of it, but we could pick any of the common representations and stick with it. I think that pretty much everyone agrees on something along the line of 0x04 plus the big-endian representation of the point in some standard coordinate system, for 65 unambiguous bytes.) --Andy