From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 51BE878D for ; Wed, 3 Aug 2016 22:39:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-vk0-f52.google.com (mail-vk0-f52.google.com [209.85.213.52]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF59720B for ; Wed, 3 Aug 2016 22:39:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-vk0-f52.google.com with SMTP id x130so157154672vkc.0 for ; Wed, 03 Aug 2016 15:39:08 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <1470228158.2482.36.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1470262192.2858.11.camel@HansenPartnership.com> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2016 15:39:06 -0700 Message-ID: To: James Bottomley Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1143092258678005393280be Cc: Josh Boyer , Mark Brown , ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org, Jason Cooper Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TOPIC] Secure/verified boot and roots of trust List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , --001a1143092258678005393280be Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Aug 3, 2016 3:09 PM, "James Bottomley" < James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> wrote: > > > > I'm not personally too worried about verifying initramfs -- initramfs > > is functionally equivalent to the root filesystem, and they ought to > > be verifiable the same way. > > Yes, but if you worry about protecting yourself from hackers, IMA can > verify no-one tampers with your rootfs; what verifies that no-one > tampers with your initrd (which is a very powerful instrument to > subvert a linux boot)? IMA? Awhile ago I suggested adding tar parsing with xattrs to initramfs, and I'm not sure what went wrong with that idea. --001a1143092258678005393280be Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Aug 3, 2016 3:09 PM, "James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansen= partnership.com> wrote:

> >
> > I'm not personally too worried about verifying initramfs -- i= nitramfs
> > is functionally equivalent to the root filesystem, and they ought= to
> > be verifiable the same way.
>
> Yes, but if you worry about protecting yourself from hackers, IMA can<= br> > verify no-one tampers with your rootfs; what verifies that no-one
> tampers with your initrd (which is a very powerful instrument to
> subvert a linux boot)?

IMA?=C2=A0 Awhile ago I suggested adding tar parsing with xa= ttrs to initramfs, and I'm not sure what went wrong with that idea.

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