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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
	Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>,
	"ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
	<ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@sirena.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TOPIC] Secure/verified boot and roots of trust
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2016 21:34:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWDvwPrYiHE41Uhpz3m=-V=zJMLSUwBgEzVho=iRv4RhQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPeXnHsPpvWaTh=Lv29t22UJ8N2VduAAgozpQ_CdeH4XoYwqEQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 8:32 PM, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 7:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>>  - Appeasing the Secure Boot deities.  AFAIK this specifically
>> requires that we verify the kernel and its modules using a combination
>> of EFI-supplied and distro keys.
>
> Eh not quite. The rules are basically that if a Microsoft-signed
> object can be used to compromise other operating systems, Microsoft
> may unilaterally blacklist that object. Allowing arbitrary module
> loading or arbitrary kexec clearly makes it straightforward to simply
> use a signed Linux boot chain to then boot a compromised version of
> any other operating system, defeating the point of Secure Boot.

> Distro
> keys are used for module signing because that's the easiest way to
> handle it (sign them during build and then discard the key),

With my module hashing patches, that'll be even simpler.  The kernel
image will contain a list of SHA256 hashes of in-tree .ko files and
will accept those files.

> UEFI keys
> are used to appease some manufacturers (they can ship their
> binary-only drivers signed with a key that's in firmware) and shim
> keys are used to allow users to sign their own modules.

Hmm.  Would it be okay if a physically present user could subvert it?
For example, if a physically present user typed "insecure" into a
bootloader command line and thus turned off signature verification?

>>  - Bootloader supplies public keys and policy to the kernel.
>
> The main problem here is the lack of a standardised way of passing
> data from bootloader to kernel. We can't just append a CPIO to the
> initramfs because using arbitrary initramfs is a reasonable policy for
> many usecases. Having a secure architecture-independent communications
> channel between the bootloader and the kernel would be helpful in
> various ways.

Indeed.  I wonder if we could design such a thing?  Or at least
something that requires only minimal arch-specific work.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-03  4:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-03  2:58 Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03  3:24 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-03  3:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03  4:34   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-08-03  4:42     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-08-03  4:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03  5:15     ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03  8:33 ` Alexandre Belloni
2016-08-03 10:31 ` Mark Brown
2016-08-03 10:43 ` David Howells
2016-08-03 16:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 17:17     ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03 17:23       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 17:26         ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03 17:28           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 18:00         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-08-03 23:01     ` Ben Hutchings
2016-08-03 23:22       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-04  5:26         ` Kees Cook
2016-08-17 11:38       ` Ben Hutchings
2016-08-17 13:03         ` Mimi Zohar
2016-08-17 16:11           ` Ben Hutchings
2016-08-18 12:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2016-08-03 12:42 ` James Bottomley
2016-08-03 17:04   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 17:23     ` Matthew Garrett
2016-08-03 17:29       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-03 22:09     ` James Bottomley
     [not found]       ` <CALCETrVpCnfOJ2aXkNsOXatQAF6NG-AcJpxeYfA9wG_t2ocykg@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]         ` <CALCETrWgS0XObzxfQWQbyntVEn6QF81K2TVbS4bGNyN6EcYb_A@mail.gmail.com>
2016-08-03 22:39           ` Andy Lutomirski

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