From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1C78F8DD for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 21:56:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-oi0-f52.google.com (mail-oi0-f52.google.com [209.85.218.52]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 97CD4118 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 21:56:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: by oiev193 with SMTP id v193so82364153oie.3 for ; Tue, 11 Aug 2015 14:56:55 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <16035.1439324695@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <20436.1438090619@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1438096213.5441.147.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438097471.5441.152.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438099839.5441.165.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1438100102.26913.183.camel@infradead.org> <30361.1438101879@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1438111168.26913.189.camel@infradead.org> <1438121016.5441.233.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <16035.1439324695@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 14:56:35 -0700 Message-ID: To: David Howells Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Cc: James Bottomley , Luis Rodriguez , "ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org" , Kyle McMartin Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Firmware signing List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 at 1:24 PM, David Howells wrote: > Hi James, > > The top patch here: > > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=modsign-pkcs7-2 > > allows demand loading of keys based on their SKID into a special keyring from > which they get erased after an arbitrary 3 minutes of existence. This key can > then be used to verify a signature instead of using the primary system keyring > used for module signature checking. > > Building on this, a driver could have a SKID compiled into it which could then > be used to load a key for request_firmware() to use in verifying the blobs > that that driver requires. > Who signs the vendor key? Why are we bothering loading device vendor keys into a keyring in the first place? Why not just have an API to request firmware either signed by a literal key provided by the driver *or* whatever keys the system trusts in general for firmware signing? --Andy