From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
"ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
<ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
Emily Ratliff <eratliff@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 15:57:22 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJxQadzp_bOo0KVjJ0VgwTPBDaEHqxDe8Rr=aCg8ROg9A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1508250612360.22949@namei.org>
On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 1:17 PM, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 24 Aug 2015, James Bottomley wrote:
>
>> Um, forgive me for being dense, but doesn't fixing the flaws stop their
>> exploitation? In any event, Hardening means "reducing the attack
>> surface" and that encompasses both active and passive means (including
>> actual bug fixing).
>
> Hardening is mitigating those flaws. You'll never find every flaw, but
> you can mitigate against entire classes of flaws being exploited.
>
>> > The
>> > hardening the kernel needs is about taking away exploitation tools,
>> > not killing bugs. (Though killing bugs is still great.)
>>
>> It's both. One of the old standards for attacking C code was buffer
>> overruns. Remove those via detection tools and you reduce the attack
>> surface.
>
> In this case, we're specifically talking about hardening the kernel to
> mitigate exploitation of flaws. Kernel self-protection may be a better
> term (and recently surfaced in an NSA presentation at LSS: p.23 of
>
> http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/lss2015_selinuxinandroidlollipopandm_smalley.pdf
Yup. Using "kernel self-protection" cuts right to the point. I'm in
debt to Stephen for finding the right marketing term for "kernel
memory corruption vulnerability exploit mitigation". :)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-08-24 22:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-08-24 4:20 James Morris
2015-08-24 11:46 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 11:56 ` James Morris
2015-08-24 17:17 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 17:39 ` Julia Lawall
2015-08-24 18:01 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 18:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 19:00 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 22:05 ` Greg KH
2015-08-25 0:51 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2015-08-31 20:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-31 20:22 ` josh
2015-08-26 20:51 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-26 21:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2015-08-30 0:41 ` [Ksummit-discuss] Self nomination Matthew Garrett
2015-08-24 11:48 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 12:29 ` Linus Walleij
2015-08-24 12:51 ` Jason Cooper
2015-08-24 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:09 ` James Bottomley
2015-08-24 20:17 ` James Morris
2015-08-24 20:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 22:22 ` James Morris
2015-08-24 23:20 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-08-25 0:06 ` James Morris
2015-08-25 0:06 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-27 22:08 ` [Ksummit-discuss] grsecurity and kernel hardening Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-27 22:49 ` James Bottomley
2015-08-27 23:03 ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-24 23:04 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:45 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-08-24 22:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2015-08-24 23:25 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:28 ` josh
2015-08-24 22:55 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-31 20:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-09-01 9:03 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-09-01 16:52 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-01 16:50 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 15:15 ` Shuah Khan
2015-08-25 16:15 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:30 ` Mark Brown
2015-08-25 16:33 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:58 ` Shuah Khan
2015-09-22 12:24 ` Dan Carpenter
2015-09-22 12:55 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-09-22 12:59 ` Julia Lawall
2015-09-22 18:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 16:20 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2015-08-24 17:19 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:50 ` James Morris
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to='CAGXu5jJxQadzp_bOo0KVjJ0VgwTPBDaEHqxDe8Rr=aCg8ROg9A@mail.gmail.com' \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
--cc=eratliff@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox