From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>,
ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [CORE TOPIC] dev/maintainer workflow security
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 15:08:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+NY8-5WPcP1kLZsKgzmbQ=L0Q18XZ6FYeVTcFGDLrRSw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150710162328.GB12009@thunk.org>
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 9:23 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 11:50:30AM -0400, Josh Boyer wrote:
>> > This is a topic of interest to me that I think would best benefit from a
>> > conference room discussion.
>> >
>> > Items to discuss:
>> >
>> > - Survey the room on workflows and security posture for kernel work
>> > - Discussion of threat models, attack vectors
>> > - Discuss mitigation methods, tools and techniques
>> > - Identify missing tools or features of tools
>> >
>> > The intent is to discuss end point security with regards to protecting
>> > the kernel source tree.
>>
>> Interesting. Though I think it needs a broader audience to be honest.
>> It would be far easier to use distros as an attack vector than to try
>> subverting the upstream source code. This might be a good topic for
>> something like Linux Plumbers.
>
> I agree that the issue of trusting distros and the possibility of
> hiding malware in distro software is an important one, and one which
> is best addressed at something like Plumbers.
>
> However, there are a number of Kernel-specific security issues which
> are just as important --- how we maintain our own personal security,
> and how we make sure a backdoor doesn't get slipped into the kernel
> source tree.
I'm curious about the larger set of security topics. Jason's topic
seems to surround "supply chain security", but I think we've got a lot
of other areas. Is focusing on just that topic the right thing to do?
- supply chain security: I see two parts:
- intentionally malicious commits (as Ted describes below)
- personal security (keep commit credentials secure from theft)
- reactive security: bug fix workflow
- getting fixes _to end users_ (not the same as publishing to stable)
- documenting impact when known (avoiding intentional obfuscation)
- proactive security: stop security flaws from happening in the first place
- scope analysis (defending both userspace and kernel from attack)
- threat analysis (how are attacks being made now and in future?)
- exposure analysis (syscall interface, device firmware, etc)
- static checkers (find and eliminate bug classes in the code)
- run-time mitigation features (endless list: memory protection, CFI,
ASLR, anti-bruteforcing, etc)
My question would be: where do we need discussion? "Supply chain
security" was discussed a fair bit after the kernel.org incident.
"Reactive security" has seen endless discussion, and there are a
number of stale-mate topics. "Proactive security" is what I'm most
interested in, but tends to lack enough engineering resources to
really make strong headway. There are a number of dedicated folks, but
we need more people on that topic, not really more discussion.
I'm not saying we shouldn't have a discussion: I'm more curious to
hear where people think we should focus for a single session's time.
> This ends up relating to the code reviewer problem, and I've always
> been convinced that if I had a a few dozen students to coach in a
> computer security class, tasked as part of a semester-long class
> project to attempt to sneak an obfuscated security bug as part of some
> code cleanup or refactoring patch, at least one of them would end up
> getting into Linus's tree. The only reason why I haven't done this is
> no one would have forgiven me afterwards, and the resulting bad
> publicity wouldn't be good for Linux.
My paranoid brain thinks this has likely already happened. :)
> I wonder if this might be better done as a panel session during the
> wider technical session day?
As mentioned in other replies, I think this would be best served as a
panel session to keep the audience tighter. It's a large field of
discussion and we might have problems staying on track even in the
smaller group.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-10 22:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-10 14:38 Jason Cooper
2015-07-10 15:50 ` Josh Boyer
2015-07-10 16:23 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-07-10 19:45 ` Steven Rostedt
2015-07-10 20:34 ` Olof Johansson
2015-07-11 1:19 ` Jason Cooper
2015-07-10 22:08 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2015-07-11 1:48 ` Jason Cooper
2015-07-11 7:31 ` James Bottomley
2015-07-11 16:02 ` Jason Cooper
2015-07-11 16:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-07-13 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2015-07-13 8:32 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-07-13 14:07 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2015-07-13 15:39 ` James Bottomley
2015-07-13 16:02 ` Mark Brown
2015-07-13 16:05 ` Konstantin Ryabitsev
2015-07-13 16:14 ` James Bottomley
2015-07-13 18:22 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-07-13 16:46 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2015-07-13 17:12 ` josh
2015-07-13 19:37 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-07-15 18:42 ` Steven Rostedt
2015-07-13 23:25 ` Kees Cook
2015-07-14 7:47 ` James Bottomley
2015-07-14 16:20 ` Kees Cook
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