From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 050BD305 for ; Mon, 11 Jul 2016 17:53:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-wm0-f42.google.com (mail-wm0-f42.google.com [74.125.82.42]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6463B291 for ; Mon, 11 Jul 2016 17:53:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wm0-f42.google.com with SMTP id o80so62132189wme.1 for ; Mon, 11 Jul 2016 10:53:45 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: keescook@google.com In-Reply-To: References: From: Kees Cook Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 13:53:42 -0400 Message-ID: To: Andy Lutomirski Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Cc: Jann Horn , "ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org" Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TOPIC] kernel hardening / self-protection / whatever List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 12:28 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > Are there useful things to discuss in person about hardening? (I > don't want to bikeshed about the name at the kernel summit if we can > possibly avoid it.) > > Plausible sub-topics include: > > - "USERCOPY" hardening The whitelisting stuff might be interesting, but I think it's mostly about standardizing how architectures define their *copy_*_user() implementations so that things like KASan and now the hardening infrastructure can hook it reliably. > - Virtually mapped stacks (I'm hoping to have that in for x86 before > kernel summit...) Yeah, this should just go in. :) Perhaps a discussion for other architectures, and the specific requirements (which are mostly well documented, excepting some notes on stuff like the guard page at either end, etc). > - Refcount This one needs a solid technical step first; I'd like to avoid bikeshedding without real code to work from. > I don't how much of this really needs an in-person meeting, but maybe > some if it would benefit. Perhaps some discussion on new/interesting/better gcc plugins, as the infrastructure and several good examples should have landed by then? -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security