From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>,
"ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
<ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TOPIC] kernel hardening / self-protection / whatever
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2016 07:17:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <57A34E66.1040608@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jL085S-feY_uy68tCMZwOHcg5QPzyE0eXiJviqCwau90g@mail.gmail.com>
On 08/03/2016 10:32 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > BTW, while not a kernel security feature, I've been asked in the past to enable
>> > execute-only (no read) permissions on arm64 (e.g. mmap(PROT_EXEC)).
>> > I have a simple patch for this, though I'm not 100% sure about user ABI implications.
>> > So far I'm not aware of any user application using PROT_EXEC only and also
>> > expecting PROT_READ.
> x86 is working on this too, and IIRC, they uncovered some "fun" ELF
> corner cases. I've added Dave for some more background...
I haven't been able to find anything in the wild that actually uses
PROT_EXEC by itself. The corner cases I hit were because I took a
PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC mapping and munged it to really be PROT_EXEC only as
an experiment. It blew up pretty spectacularly because of
non-page-aligned ELF sections creating pages that really do contain
instructions _and_ read-only data.
The exec-only support got in 4.6 and does work under qemu today if
anyone wants to give it a try.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-04 14:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-11 4:28 Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-11 13:05 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2016-07-11 16:30 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-07-11 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-12 16:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-07-21 15:54 ` Mark Rutland
2016-07-11 17:33 ` Jann Horn
2016-07-19 15:40 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-07-20 2:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-20 2:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-07-20 6:42 ` Herbert Xu
2016-07-21 17:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-07-11 17:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-11 18:07 ` Josh Triplett
2016-07-11 18:59 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-31 9:55 ` Paul Burton
2016-07-31 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-01 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-01 19:42 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-03 22:53 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-04 5:32 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-04 5:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-04 5:54 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-05 0:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-08 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 0:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-04 14:17 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2016-08-04 22:29 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-01 9:34 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [nominations] " Mark Rutland
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