From: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
To: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com>
Cc: ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [MAINTAINERS SUMMIT] Handling of embargoed security issues
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 14:22:41 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180912042241.GA8537@350D> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180906225531.GB2251@localhost.localdomain>
On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 03:55:33PM -0700, Eduardo Valentin wrote:
> Hey,
>
> On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 09:18:07PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> > I believe we have reasonably well-established process for handling
> > security issues that are a matter of a single, reasonably self-contained
> > fixup.
> >
> > Past experiences with Meltdown, Spectre and L1TF have shown that we're not
> > really ready to handle that in a reasonably sane way yet.
> >
> > Yeah, at the end of the day we managed to have the fixes propagated in
> > time to Linus' tree, to stable, and to distros as well, but it was
> > completely out of anything regular, and definitely had permanent damaging
> > effects (I'd say both in personal and business aspects for almost
> > everybody who had to participate).
> >
> > I'd believe that everybody involved would agree that this didn't work
> > really well, and if it potentially would have to happen again (and we
> > already went through it at least twice this year), it would not be
> > sustainable.
> >
> > I am not completely sure what we could do to improve this, especially with
> > our kernel community hats on -- I am pretty sure a lot is happening on the
> > corporate level between individual "corporate stakeholders". Ideas I think
> > would be worth discussing:
> >
> > - how to adapt our processess to be able to deal with such situations
> > better should they happen in the future again. So far all our
> > longer-term development has been concentrated around LKML (and other
> > MLs) and the existing maintainership communities / structures, but the
> > embargos for new big features don't really fit into this
> >
> > - how to make sure that proper pressure is applied on the companies that
> > are handling embargoes irresponsibly wrt. linux/opensource development
> > (well, even some proprietary vendors were rather unhappy with those
> > events) from us as the linux kernel community
> > + and perhaps even more importantly, what exactly we should be pressing
> > for
>
> Should we add maybe a point here to discuss which kernels are to be
> considered for patching in these cases? All the stable branches? Only
> mainline? Obviously, either extreme cases can hurt people. Patching
> older kernels requires insane amount of work and patching only mainline
> leaves distros on limbo.
>
I don't think we can decide, may be the right thing to do is to consider where
the pressure is coming from
1. Security researcher's wanting to set aggressive embargo schedules?
2. Are distros supporting older kernels for too long?
The spectre/meltdown affected all architectures/variants of CPUs and
so the overhead was massive and I don't think that will change depending
the layer in which a security vulnerability is discovered.
> Honestly, the fact that somehow the community managed to make this to
> stable (and eventually to distros) is really good. Imagine for a second
> a world in which these made only mainline and no stable branch..
>
Half the world would have bugs in their patches :)
> In any case, maybe the community should consider what really is going to
> be effectively patched. That may be an extra push for distros to upgrade
> older kernels as well.
>
>
Balbir Singh.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-12 4:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-06 19:18 Jiri Kosina
2018-09-06 20:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-09-06 21:14 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-06 22:51 ` Eduardo Valentin
2018-09-07 9:17 ` Jani Nikula
2018-09-07 14:43 ` David Woodhouse
2018-09-06 22:55 ` Eduardo Valentin
2018-09-07 8:21 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-09-10 23:26 ` Eduardo Valentin
2018-09-11 8:45 ` Greg KH
2018-09-11 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-11 18:28 ` Greg KH
2018-09-11 18:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-07 13:30 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-09 12:55 ` Greg KH
2018-09-09 19:48 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-10 4:04 ` Eduardo Valentin
2018-09-12 7:03 ` Greg KH
2018-09-10 4:12 ` Eduardo Valentin
2018-09-10 11:10 ` Mark Brown
2018-09-12 4:22 ` Balbir Singh [this message]
2018-09-08 4:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-08 8:56 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-08 11:21 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2018-09-08 11:34 ` Greg KH
2018-09-08 14:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-08 15:29 ` Greg KH
2018-09-08 15:00 ` James Bottomley
2018-09-08 15:32 ` Greg KH
2018-09-08 15:54 ` James Bottomley
2018-09-08 19:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-09-08 21:24 ` James Bottomley
2018-09-08 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-09 12:18 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2018-09-10 22:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-11 8:48 ` Greg KH
2018-09-09 12:51 ` Greg KH
2018-09-09 14:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-09-09 14:38 ` James Bottomley
2018-09-09 14:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-09 17:20 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-09-09 17:48 ` David Woodhouse
2018-09-09 18:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-09 18:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-09-09 19:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-09-09 20:20 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-09 21:36 ` James Bottomley
2018-09-10 9:25 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-10 14:40 ` James Bottomley
2018-09-11 8:20 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-11 9:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-09 19:41 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-08 19:26 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-09-08 19:47 ` James Bottomley
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