From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DD5E340C for ; Tue, 1 Nov 2016 03:15:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from EUR01-HE1-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-he1eur01on0133.outbound.protection.outlook.com [104.47.0.133]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 29CF7170 for ; Tue, 1 Nov 2016 03:15:24 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 20:15:07 -0700 From: Andrei Vagin To: Message-ID: <20161101031506.GA32626@outlook.office365.com> References: <20160903052014.GA4850@outlook.office365.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="koi8-r" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20160903052014.GA4850@outlook.office365.com> Cc: Kirill Kolyshkin , Eric Dumazet , David Ahern , Patrick McHardy , Pablo Neira Ayuso Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Netlink engine issues, and ways to fix those List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Hello everyone, I have never been before on kernel-summit and don't know how talks are planed here. Looks like we have enough people how want to duscuss the subject. Maybe, if it is not too late, we can choose a time for this discussion? I'm here for Linux Plumbers and have a definite plan on Friday from 2pm to 5pm. Any other time works for me. Thanks, Andrei On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 10:20:14PM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote: > The netlink interface proved itself as a great way to perform > descriptor-based kernel/userspace communication. It is especially useful > for cases involving a big amount of data to transfer. The netlink > communication protocol is simple and elegant; it also allows to extend > the message format without breaking backward compatibility. > > One big problem of netlink is credentials. When a user-space process is > opening a new file descriptor, kernel saves the opener's credentials to > f_cred field of the file struct. After that, every access to that fd are > checked against the saved credentials. In essence, this allows for a > process to open a file descriptor as root and then drop capabilities. > With netlink socket, it is not possible to implement this access scheme. > > Currently netlink is widely used in the network subsystem, but there are > also a few users outside of networking, such as audit and taskstats. > Developers who used netlink for anything except the networking know > there are some issues. For example, taskstats code has broken user and > pid namespace support. > > Another potential user of netlink socket is task_diag, a faster > /proc/PID-like interface proposed some time ago > (https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/7/6/142). It makes sense to use the netlink > interface for it, too, but the whole feature is currently blocked by the > netlink discussion. > > A few months ago Andy Lutomirski suggested to rework the netlink > interface in order to solve the known issues. We suggest discussing his > idea: > > ----- snip --- snip --- snip ----- > (taken from http://lists.openwall.net/netdev/2016/05/05/51) > > The tl;dr is that Andrey wants to add an interface to ask a pidns some > questions, and netlink looks natural, except that using netlink sockets > to interrogate a pidns seems rather problematic. šI would also love to > see a decent interface for interrogating user namespaces, and again, > netlink would be great, except that it's a socket and makes no sense in > this context. > > Netlink had, and possibly still has, tons of serious security bugs > involving code checking send() callers' creds. šI found and fixed a few > a couple years ago. šTo reiterate once again, send() CANNOT use caller > creds safely. š(I feel like I say this once every few weeks. It's > getting old.) > > I realize that it's convenient to use a socket as a context to keep > state between syscalls, but it has some annoying side effects: > > - It makes people want to rely on send()'s caller's creds. > - It's miserable in combination with seccomp. > - It doesn't play nicely with namespaces. > - It makes me wonder why things like task_diag, which have nothing > to do with networking, seem to get tangled up with networking. > > > Would it be worth considering adding a parallel interface, using it for > new things, and slowly migrating old use cases over? > > int issue_kernel_command(int ns, int command, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, int flags); > > ns is an actual namespace fd or: > > KERNEL_COMMAND_CURRENT_NETNS > KERNEL_COMMAND_CURRENT_PIDNS > etc, or a special one: > KERNEL_COMMAND_GLOBAL. šKERNEL_COMMAND_GLOBAL can't be used in a > non-root namespace. > > KERNEL_COMMAND_GLOBAL works even for namespaced things, if the > relevant current ns is the init namespace. š(This feature is optional, > but it would allow gradually namespacing global things.) > > command is an enumerated command. šEach command implies a namespace > type, and, if you feed this thing the wrong namespace type, you get > EINVAL. šThe high bit of command indicates whether it's read-only > command. > > iov gives a command in the format expected, which, for the most part, > would be a netlink message. > > The return value is an fd that you can call read/readv on to read the > response. šIt's not a socket (or at least you can't do normal socket > operations on it if it is a socket behind the scenes). šThe > implementation of read() promises *not* to look at caller creds. šThe > returned fd is unconditionally cloexec -- it's 2016 already. šSheesh. > > When you've read all the data, all you can do is close the fd. šYou > can't issue another command on the same fd. šYou also can't call write() > or send() on the fd unless someone has a good reason why you should be > able to and why it's safe. šYou can't issue another command on the same > fd. > > I imagine that the implementation could re-use a bunch of netlink code > under the hood.